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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to derive an operational definition of local control and to devise a model, the Local Control Index, for classifying degrees of local control by using the education codes of eight states--Arizona, California, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, and Texas. The Local Control Index consists of four profiles--Professionalism, Finance, Control, and Curriculum--which represent those areas usually included or excluded in state education codes. Political culture, constitutional law, and history form the skeletal framework of the Local Control Index. After an introductory statement of the problem and procedure, a review of the literature covers historiography of local control and its treatment from the perspectives of political science, educational politics, and the courts. Local control is defined, accordingly, as the power of the electorate or community to influence the legislation or policy-making process of the state and local boards within the value base of a given political culture. A conceptual framework is thus developed for the Local Control Index, along with instrumentation and a computational model. The study concludes that local control of education is a function of political culture, based on the authoritatively allocated values of professionalism, finance, control, and curriculum. (Author/TE)

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THE LOCAL CONTROL INDEX: A PROPOSED MODEL FOR CLASSIFYING TYPES OF LOCAL CONTROL AS A FUNCTION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS

BY

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
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Dr. Gregory P. Maltby, Chairman

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Few issues in American society have been more controversial than those regarding local control, especially when they concern education. Indeed, "education has long been the hottest local issue."[1] That local control of education is probably a moot issue is not important; that professional educators, citizens, and politicians still debate its ramifications is.

The controversy stems from the fact that nowhere does the Constitution mention education. Indeed, the states have controlled their own educational systems from the beginning of the Republic. The preamble of the Constitution declares that the United States Government, the States as a whole, are to provide for the general welfare to substantiate the claims made by citizens "that the national government can and must require state conformity to certain basic educational principles regardless of state residual power."[2] Advocates of equal protection of the laws and the proponents of civil rights aver that the Constitution demands this from the states; to supporters of decentralization, this is federal encroachment upon the states.[3] Hence, the disagreement is a result of differences in the interpretation of the Constitution within the context of the national political culture.

The national political culture itself is a conglomerate of three major political subcultures.[4] Each of these subcultures cooperatively

inhabit the country, existing concurrently or even overlapping one another. Through the transcience of time, each has proportionally dispersed itself from coast to coast. Moreover, they represent migratory patterns of different ethnicities to specific sections of the country in rather ordered patterns. Each culture emphasizes different issues.[5]

Local control of education has its cultural origins in Stuart and Tudor England. To the English, culture represented the superstructure of past experiences.[6] In the sixteenth century, the family exclusively controlled the education of the child. "The basis of education lay secure within the continuing traditions of an integrated, unified culture."[7]

In the seventeenth century, upon their arrival in the New World, the de novo settlers occupied themselves with the necessities of survival in a wilderness--sustenance and shelter. So exigent were these tasks that they left little time for anything else. Subsequently, the traditional patrilineal English family began to deteriorate. In addition to the fragmentation of the family, the community began to lose its homogeneity due to the diversity of its immigrants. What was once a tightly woven fabric of homogeneity in Elizabethan England was now a heterogeneous patchwork of communities in seventeenth-century America; what was a certainty was now contemplative; what was traditional was now temporary.[8]

Because the families could no longer perform their role as principal educator, they delegated this responsibility to the schools. In Stuart and Tudor times, the schools represented the apex of the

educational process. The family assumed a supportive role in the process. It was the heterogeneous nature of the communities, however, that complicated the role of the schools. Each segment of Colonial America expected the transference of its culture to its children: each segment was struggling against assimilation into a developing dominant culture.[9]

As the colonies entered the eighteenth century, the citizens increasingly interested themselves in economic growth, population growth, and individual rights. Settlers pushed westward into Pennsylvania, New York, Kentucky, and Ohio in search of land since it was inexpensive and in abundance. Moreover, certain geographic locations reflected certain cultural values and traditions because certain ethnicities tended to aggregate in those areas. As a result of this cultural diversity, the schools reflected these idiosyncrasies. Hence, the communities controlled every aspect of their childrens' schooling. In addition, the communities demanded more responsibility from the states and their legislatures. After ratification, the Constitution left to the states, in the form of a plenary power in the Tenth Amendment, the responsibility of educating their denizens.

The nineteenth century brought to education the reality of its diverse clientele. With this realization came the desire for uniformity; with this desire arose the need for professional guidance. Although the wealthier citizens could comfortably afford a private school, the poor needed an education as well. Essentially, the school had to be classless and publicly supported--a "common" school.[10]

The nineteenth-century architects of compulsory attendance viewed this as a means of educating its indigents in the "public" schools and as the sole interface between the children and the world at large. In the sparsely settled rural areas and populated new cities, the schools became the remedy for ameliorating the squalor and poverty in the ghettoes; it was necessary to expose the children to those things which society wanted them to know about America and the world. By mid-nineteenth century, there arose a great debate, as it were, regarding the philosophical burdens of the newly created public schools. The Conservative Social Darwinists held that the school should instruct and inculcate its students as to their place in society. The Reformed Social Darwinists contended that the avowed purpose of the school was to elevate its students to greater heights of intellect, to develop the students' innate talents.[11] "The watchwords of reform became centralization, expertise, professionalization, nonpolitical control, and efficiency."[12]

This particular point in educational history also marked the elevation of teaching to a profession. With the professionalization of teaching came its politicization. The resultant educational bureaucracy presumed to possess competency in the internal issues of education--curriculum, equipment, class size, didactic methods, library purchases, discipline--which the laymen did not.[13] By the end of the nineteenth century, "education was public, free, widespread, and systematic, at least through the grammar school. What happened in the interim was that one resource--the political--was used to achieve another--the educational."[14]

The public schools made their debut into the twentieth century in much the same form as they existed in the previous century. "The nineteenth century's rural romanticism died slowly in the twentieth century. The sacred rural community was beheld in all its virtues, expurgated from its weaknesses and petty cruelties."[15] Neither the structure nor the function of the schools have changed in the last 112 years of public education. Indeed, "the basic administrative structure and pattern for current school policy making were established around the turn of the twentieth century."[16]

Realizing the full extent of their responsibility in education, the states increasingly gained more control in governing the enterprise. With this increase in control, the local districts disconsolately relinquished their grasp of the schools. "The special constitutional arrangement which characterizes educational governance in general and school districts in particular is mainly a relationship between a sovereign state and delegated local powers,"[17] a carryover from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

At present, American education is once again in the limelight. Citizens are demanding more fiscal responsibility from the state but unwilling to relinquish what little control they presumably possess at the local level. "Those comfortable days, still sought after, are gone."[18] Those states which have retained their localistic tradition in the past century have state governments which assume as little responsibility as possible, thus leaving the onus of government to their localities.[19] Moreover, the battle between professionals and laymen for control of the schools still continues. "The ultimate responsibility for what goes on in a public school system, for what

the schools do and do not accomplish, is rested under the American political structure in the local schoolboard, not in professional educators."[20] However, "with the increasing secularity of American society, and particularly since the turn of this century, educational professionals have had increasing opportunities for political leadership.[21]

Statement of the Problem

From all of the studies conducted in educational politics and educational administration, researchers have yet to operationally define local control. Increasing the complexity is the question of "Who governs?" According to Garvue, "local control of education in the United States relative to educational programming and financing is a myth if the term control is defined as command, since the local, state, and federal governments are involved in educational control processes."[22] Thomas notes that "education is a local function, a state responsibility, and a federal concern."[23] In the late nineteenth century, "so settled became this notion of public education as essential to republican government that . . . Congress required several territories to create free, nonsectarian public schools as a precondition for statehood."[24]

Second, there is the question of "Is it democratic?" Mann[25] uses the normative definition of democracy as substantive representation responding to client desires for public service to what is, currently, its logical extreme. Political representation, he states, is "the way school administrators take account of the needs and interests of the public," and "the proper inclusion and weighing of community wishes

and interests in administrative action."[26] "Throughout the history of education, the balance of control has shifted among the various participants in the policy-making process."[27] Essentially, the electorate is the entity that supposedly gives local control of education its meaning in America.[28]

Further complicating the issue of local control, state control notwithstanding, is that of the perennial struggle between laymen and professionals. Saxe and Gish state that community control "is the direct participation of citizens (not the members of the regular board of education) in the formation of educational policy. Control, especially of personnel and budget, is the usual parting of the ways for educators and citizens."[29] Garvue underscores this sentiment in stating that "laymen value local control of schools and tend to interpret this concept to mean control by the system's citizens rather than by professional educators."[30] Mann[31] states that the "professional litany reinforces such attitudes by teaching that people who are not professionals are ipso facto not competent to participate in 'professional' education decisions."[32] As a result, "professional educators and, to a lesser extent, school board members have predominant influence and do not systematically seek views of the lay community.[33]

At the state level, the concept of local control seems dubious at best. In theory, the seat of educational power in every state is the legislature. "When arrangements governing education are imbedded in written state constitutions, they are most difficult to change."[34] Most state legislatures created a state board to govern education. But, "all states are alike in being the object of increased political

demands about school policies--curriculum, training of professionals, finance, and so on."[35] Although localities resent state intervention, "the state board may do nearly anything it likes within the state's laws to control education."[36] However, if the state accepts parental rights in education, then the schools must be prepared to accept the role of parents in the determination of policy in the schools.[37] Moreover, if the state is "the servant of the expressed will and consent of the people," then it should not presume itself to be the "official teacher and arbiter of religion, science, art, literature, music, or culture."[38]

The heterogeneity of American society has also played a vital role in the concept of local control. Koerner notes that "diversity is still the main characteristic of local control."[39] The American Council on Education concurs in noting that "each community has acted in and for itself in appropriating just such parts of the aspects of the common heritage as were adapted to its peculiar conditions and previous experience."[40] As a result, public school programs most often reflect the political compromises and diverse values of heterogeneous states or local districts.[41] It is this vast heterogeneity, matched to the individualistic philosophy of Americans, that comprises a purview of differing needs, resources, and preferences.[42] Hence, "the diversity [of local school districts] illustrates the tenaciousness with which Americans hold to these remnants of localism and grassroots expression of the public will."[43]

As the opening remarks indicate, professionals and laymen continue to view the local school district with the halo of the sacred nineteenth-century rural community. Moreover, the local school

district is one of the few areas which has resisted the process of urbanization in the twentieth century. Subsequently, as a result of this resistance, laymen view the local school district as the last stronghold of direct democracy in American public affairs. Their view rests on the rubric that the local school district "belongs" to them, concomitantly ignoring the fact that the local school district is legally an agency of the state. Koerner comments, from his studies in educational politics, that "experts say that the beauties of local control are mostly myths and the neighborhood school an outmoded way of organizing things."[44] Nonetheless, "a school district is the basic governmental unit through which the exercise of local control is effected."[45]

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to develop a set of propositions about all states which helps account for the differences among states. The findings, in turn, will lead toward an operational definition of local control. Since the study is heuristic in nature, it will posit a conceptual framework to determine which aspects are untenable, supportive, or need further study. In their studies of educational politics, Wirt and Kirst state that "heuristic theory is not so much a predictive scheme as a method of analytically separating and categorizing items in experience."[46] Easton indicates that, rather than seek an answer which fully explains the functioning or offers a fireproof set of concepts towards that end, researchers should seek those which aid us in taking a small step in the right direction.[47] Hence, rather than use classical "theory," a "conceptual framework" is

more apropos as it allows for the ordering of existing knowledge or speculations.[48]

The democratic principle of local control has a history that extends well beyond the birth of the United States. Therefore, to understand its importance in American education, one must trek through the annals of time to trace its origin, establishment, and subsequent transplantation and transformation in America. Boyd, in discussing the shortcomings of other studies in this area, notes that "among scholars, there has been a decided tendency for research to have a static perspective, to be time and place bound, and to be inclined to become fixated on oversimplified themes."[49] McGivney, in replicating the Iannaccone and Lutz[50] study, states that issues such as these "should be researched from an historical perspective to insure the capturing of data on a state's development (or lack thereof) over time."[51] In addition, most studies in educational politics have failed in their attempts to recognize the "significance of change or even of the somewhat predictable impact of evolutionary, developmental factors. Sadly, the shortsightedness seems to have afflicted scholars and practicing administrators alike."[52]

Consequently, the proposed model would serve as a means of classifying types of local control at any period in time. Zeigler and Jennings state that "a paradigm into which every school district in America could be placed would immediately make apparent all of the social and political forces which affect the control of public educational institutions."[53] This type of study does not lend itself to the survey method, as surveys "tell us too little about too many."[54] Eliot notes that "questions can and should be raised as to

the actual extent and nature of local democratic control."[55] Consequently, "more research needs to be completed in order to reach any meaningful conclusions in this area."[56] Any research conducted that concerns the political control of education should theoretically link its findings to the product of that control, the classroom student, lest the major benefits of the research be lost "and from the standpoint of educational scholarship, the research represents little more than an academic exercise."[57]

Procedure

The discussion in Chapter 2 will develop the conceptual framework of educational local control in four parts. However, the reader must not infer or otherwise conclude that the discussion is one of support or advocacy. Rather, the intrinsic purpose of the discourse is to draw a nexus between history, political culture, and constitutional school law.

First, the historiographical portion will trace the origin of local control in Colonial America. Beer[58] maintains that history as past behavior will broaden the understanding of present political processes. Ballyn[59] discusses education quite extensively in sixteenth-century England and seventeenth-century America. His discussion traces the development of the school from the sixteenth century through the eighteenth century. Throughout this historiography, Ballyn suggests that education in the United States, i.e., schooling, is a result of the transplantation and transformation of English and European culture in Colonial America.

Katz[60] describes the cultural milieu in which the schools found themselves at the turn of the nineteenth century and suggests some notions for the departure from local control. Moreover, Katz depicts the historiography of this period in American schooling by developing the main thrust of his thesis--acculturation rather than assimilation was the goal of schooling to create American habits, not to raise social status.[61]

Cremin's[62] historiographical rendition overlaps with Katz's and progresses through the 1950s. Cremin's work, however, focuses more upon the philosophical underpinnings in the evolution of the American schools. Nonetheless, his work complements the structural analysis suggested by Katz. The philosophical debate which Cremin describes is that of nature vs nurture.

The historiographical segment is an integral and vital component of the present research because it allows the reader to observe the trends and areas of concern that emerged in the evolution of the public schools. To give an abridged discussion would be to omit the basis for this research.

The second part includes research conducted in political science that is relevant to the study at hand. For example, Elazar's research on political culture[63] is particularly appropriate for understanding local control because the United States has become an aggregate civil society, emerging from the historic interactions between the resemblances and disparities among the ethnic and socioreligious groups that traversed the geographical diversity of North America.[64] Subsequently, as they established their state and local governments, "these political subcultures were embedded in the

nation's political processes and institutions and, in turn, partially protected by them."[65] Easton's trilogy[66] is particularly useful in its methodological approach to theory development for devising a conceptual framework.

The third part consists of studies conducted by Iannaccone and Lutz,[67] Lutz and Iannaccone,[68] Wirt and Kirst,[69] Zeigler and Jennings,[70] and others in educational politics which have yielded an enormous amount of information regarding the local governance of schooling. However, their resounding contention is that more research is needed. Nonetheless, the central tenet of each is that "the vote stands out as the most obvious mechanism whereby members of the public can influence educational elites."[71]

Lastly, Chapter 2 will conclude with a brief discussion of the judicial aspects of local school governance. The views of the courts are important for their illustration of pertinent points regarding the limitations of local control. Further, their view has a direct bearing on the development of the proposed dimensional variables for the model.

Among other matters, Chapter 3 will briefly summarize the major points discussed in Chapter 2 in order to develop the set of propositions about all states that helps to account for the differences in each state, the findings thereof used to derive an operational definition of local control. Because local school districts are residual legatees of the state via constitutional law, the state is the unit of analysis. On this basis, a model based on the operational definition will be used to test the validity and

reliability of the construct using a sample of eight states from different regions of the country.

Chapter 4 will utilize the model to analyze the education codes of the sample of states. After analysis of the school codes using the set of propositions, the model will be applied to each of the eight states. If this strategy serves its purpose, then the model is applicable at any given point in time for any state by virtue of its replicative design.

Chapter 5 will summarize the results and posit generalizations regarding the construct. The chapter will also indicate areas of weakness in the model which need improvement or more study. In addition, the author will propose the operational definition of local control to the community of researchers in educational administration for deliberation.

Research Design

The research for this study will entail the following process to develop the set of propositions:

1) A careful historical description of important problems in educational governance, i.e., local control;
2) the development of an explanatory model based upon historical studies as well as those of political science and educational politics;
3) the formulation of verifiable research questions based upon the grounded explanatory model;
4) conducting verification studies to test the research questions; and

5) returning after each verification study to the study at hand to ask how the model must be reformed.

The current research will focus on these five steps. However, if taken to completion, the study would have two additional steps, Steps 6 and 7 as follows:

6) Returning, when necessary, to the description of the empirical world to explain new or divergent findings, thus developing new research questions; and

7) formulating a set of laws governing the phenomena to formulate a theory.

Research Questions

1. Is local control of education a function of political culture?
2. Are constitutional provisions a function of political culture?
3. Is local control of education a function of constitutional provisions?
4. Are the profile variables consistent with the Local Control Index?
5. Are the relationships between the profile variables consistent the Local Control Index?

NOTES

[1]Christine H. Rossell, "School Desegregation and Electoral Conflict," in Frederick M. Wirt (ed.), The Polity of the School (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1975), p. 49.

[2]Erwin L. Levine, and Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. An Introduction to American Government (4th ed.; New York: MacMillan, 1979), p. 9.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966), pp. 84-154.

[5]Ibid.

[6]John Kincaid (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), p. 3.

[7]Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), p. 21. In the historical context, education was the transferrence of culture from generation to generation; schooling, on the other hand, was the institutional response to accomplishing this facet of English society in Colonial America. Through time, this distinction faded and education gradually became an all-encompassing term for the transferrence of culture through institutionalized formal instruction. Consequently, for the purposes of the research, the terms will occur interchangeably.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid., p. 100.

[10]Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 39.

[11]Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School (New York: Vintage, 1964), Chapters 3, 4.

[12]Michael W. Kirst, "The Changing Politics of Education: Actions and Strategies," in Edith K. Mosher, and Jennings L. Wagner, Jr. (eds.), The Changing Politics of Education (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan, 1978), p. 157.

[13]Roscoe C. Martin, "School Government," in Alan Rosenthal (ed.), Governing Education: A Reader on Politics, Power, and Public School Policy (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1969), p. 287.

[14]Frederick M. Wirt, and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972), p. 48.

[15]Laurence Iannaccone, and Frank Lutz, Politics, Power, Policy: The Governing of Local School Districts (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1970), p. 14.

[16]Michael W. Kirst, "The Changing Politics . . .", p. 156.

[17]Iannaccone and Lutz, Politics, Power, and Policy . . ., p. 9.

[18]Ibid. p. v.

[19]Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism, p. 186.

[20]Neal Gross, Who Runs Our Schools? (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 136-7.

[21]Iannaccone and Lutz, Politics, Power, Policy . . ., p. 54.

[22]Robert J. Garvue, Modern Public School Finance (New York: MacMillan, 1969), pp. 64-5.

[23]Norman C. Thomas, "Priority Issues in Educational Finance," in Edith K. Mosher, and Jennings L. Wagner, Jr. (eds.), The Changing Politics of Education (Berkeley, CA: M[c]Cutchon, 1978), p. 89.

[24]David Tyack, and Thomas James, "State Government and American Public Education: Exploring the 'Primeval Forest,'" History of Education Journal, 26:39-71, Spring 1986, p. 59.

[25]Dale Mann, "School Administrators as Political Representatives" in Frederick M. Wirt (ed.), The Polity of the School (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1975), p. 85.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Richard W. Saxe and Elmer H. Gish, "Public Participation in Educational Policy Making: Trends and Portents," in Edith K. Mosher, and Jennings L. Wagner, Jr. (eds.), The Changing Politics of Education (Berkeley, CA: M[c]Cutchan, 1978), p. 196.

[28]James D. Koerner, Who Controls American Education? (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p. 154.

[29]Richard W. Saxe, and Elmer H. Gish, op. cit., p. 199.
[30]Garvue, Modern Public School Finance, p. 42.

[31]Dale Mann, "Democratic Theory and Public Participation in Educational Policy Decision Making," in Frederick M. Wirt (ed.), The Polity of the School (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1975), p. 9.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Kirst, "The Changing Politics . . .," p. 156.

[34]Iannaccone and Lutz, Politics, Power, Policy . . ., p. 8.

[35]Wirt and Kirst, The Political Web . . ., p. 145.

[36]Koerner, Who Controls American Education?, p. 85.

[37]Joseph P. Locigno, Education: To Whom Does It Belong? (New York: Desclee, 1968), p. 137.

[38]Ibid., p. 135.

[39]Koerner, Who Controls American Education, p. 122.

[40]American Council on Education, Research Problems in School Finance (Washington, D.C.: Office of Education, 1933), p. 17.

[41]Wirt and Kirst, The Political Web . . ., p. 205.

[42]Ibid., p. 44.

[43]Roald F. Campbell, Luvern L. Cunningham, Raphael O. Nystrand, and Michael D. Usdan, The Organization and Control of American Schools (4th ed.; Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1980), p. 91.

[44]Koerner, Who Controls American Education?, p. 132.

[45]Campbell, et. al., The Organization . . ., p. 90.

[46]Wirt and Kirst, The Political Web . . ., 12-3.

[47]David A. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 490.

[48]Wirt and Kirst, The Political Web . . ., p. 13.

[49]William L. Boyd, "The Changing Politics of Changing Communities: The Impact of Evolutionary Factors on Educational Policy Making," in Edith K. Mosher, and Jennings L. Wagner, Jr. (eds.), The Changing Politics of Education (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan, 1978), p. 201.

[50]See Laurence Iannaccone, and Frank Lutz, Politics, Power, Policy: The Governing of Local School Districts (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1970).

[51]McGivney, "State Educational Governance Patterns . . .," p. 60.

[52]Boyd, "The Changing Politics . . .," p. 201.

[53]L. Harmon Zeigler, and M. Kent Jennings, Governing American Schools (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury, 1974), p. 9.

[54]Harry F. Wolcott, The Man in the Principal's Office (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1984), p. xiv.

[55]Thomas H. Eliot, "Toward an Understanding of Public School Politics," in Alan Rosenthal (ed.), Governing Education: A Reader on Politics, Power, and Public School Policy (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1969), p. 26.

[56]Ralph B. Kimbrough, and Michael Y. Nunnery, Educational Administration: An Introduction (2d ed.; New York: MacMillan, 1983), p. 498.

[57]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, p. 10.

[58]Samuel Beer, "Political Science and History," in Melvin Richter (ed.), Essays in Theory and History: An Approach to the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1970), p. 46.

[59]See Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960).

[60]See Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools (New York: Praeger, 1975).

[61]Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, p. 154.

[62]See Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School (New York: Vintage, 1964).

[63]See Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View of from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966) for an explanation of the establishment of political cultures.

[64]Kincaid, Political Culture . . ., pp. 1-2.

[65]Ibid., p. 2.

[66]See David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953) which presents a case for general theory in political science; _____, A Framework for Political Analysis (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1965), the second in the series of three which lays out the major categories in terms of how a theory could be developed; and _____, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), which elaborates upon the structure of concepts developed in the second volume.

[67]See Laurence Iannaccone and Frank Lutz, Politics, Power, Policy: The Governing of Local School Districts (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1970) for fuller explanation of their research.

[68]See Frank Lutz and Laurence Iannaccone (eds.), Public Participation in Local School Districts (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1978) for details concerning incumbent defeat and superintendent turnover.

[69]See Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972).

[70]See L. Harmon Zeigler and M. Kent Jennings, Governing American Schools (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury, 1974).

[71]Harry L. Summerfield, "The Neighborhood-Based Politics of Education," in Frederick M. Wirt (ed.), The Polity of the School (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1975), p. 180.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

To trace the beginning and subsequent establishment of local control, it is necessary to create an historical-political nexus to trace its constitutional evolution. Tyack and James state that "state constitutional provisions and statutes on education offer one map of the forces that shaped the development of public schools."[1] Much of the pioneer work in educational history of the nineteenth century was the progressive evolution of the state's power to standardize public schooling.[2] "As organic law, [constitutions] establish a framework of government."[3] Thus, "to understand the state's role in public education it is useful to see educational policies in this broader political/legal context."[4]

An Historiography of Local Control

When the first settlers arrived on the northeastern shores of America, they brought with them, in addition to the various sundry items, their strongly ingrained traditions of English family and culture. These traditions served the needs of a homogeneous, slowly changing rural society; they were predominantly instinctive, lacking in articulation and formality.[5] The English colonists suffered from a lack of "fixed traditions and the security of ancient forms."[6]

In Elizabethan England, the conjugal unit was only the core of a greater kinship community which merged almost imperceptibly with

society at large. Male patriarchs controlled the kinship communities, which consisted of subordinate family members. These communities shouldered the burden of education, being the primary agents in socializing the child. Not only did the family endow the child with the attitudes, behavioral patterns, and morals and manners but also reinforced the child's perception of the authoritative structure.[7]

The family extended its role in vocational training by formalizing an important institution of education, apprenticeship. In essence, what the family did not do by way of formal education, the community most often completed.[8] In addition to performing its role as vocational educator, the community served as an extension of the family in its instruction in the discipline of work, philosophy, and governance (i.e. local, state, and national governments). The transition from family to society was virtually painless for youth because of the nexus that existed between the family and local community. Indeed, the local community served as an important collaborating function of the family as a public agent.[9]

In addition to the family and local community, the church played as important a role in the educational process of the child as the family and community. Organized religion served as a unifying, centripetal force.[10] The church inculcated the individual with the ethos and highest principles that marked the society in which he lived. Essentially, the church bound the community together, gave it a sense of being, a reason for its existence.

The family, community, and church accounted for the major portion of the process by which sixteenth-century English culture transferred itself across the generations. Formal instruction in elementary and

grammar schools was highly utilitarian. Its avowed purpose was for training the individual for specific societal roles such as preacher or lawyer. To the gentry families, it represented the middle-class values of social ascent and status; formal instruction trained individuals for public responsibility. In essence, even formal instruction, i.e. schooling, bore a slight cultural burden.[11]

Since formal instruction played a strategic role in English society, it fell under the aegis of the state. However, "the role of the state in formal education, though forceful, was indirect. It was exhortatory, empowering, supervisory, regulatory; it was, with rare exceptions, neither initiating nor sustaining."[12] Support for the schools was usually, and mostly, from private benefaction. Public taxation was rare and where it existed, local and temporary. Most financial support for the schools was in the form of land endowments.

None of the settlers in British America anticipated the wrenching changes in the educational processes which they had fostered, preserved, and perpetuated in Stuart and Tudor England. By the end of the Colonial Period, education, as practiced in England, had assumed a new role. In Colonial America, "education had been dislodged from its ancient position in the social order, wrenched loose from the automatic, instinctive workings of society."[13] The schools had now assumed cultural burdens which they had never borne before.[14] The scope of education became socially purposive; the family's traditional role as the purveyor of cultural transfer was jeopardized as a result of the unexpected conflicts and enervating hardships in a strange, forbidding wilderness.[15]

The change in the role of education was symptomatic of a greater change. "Disruption and transplantation in alien soil transformed the character of traditional English family life."[16] The rudiments of survival humbled parental prestige; relationships tended towards achievement rather than ascription. The once elaborate interpenetration of family and community dissolved, concomitantly lessening the patriarchal structure.[17] What resulted was the transferrence of the maimed functions of the family to formal instructional institutions, thus endowing the schools with a broader purpose toward basic cultural goals.

Seventeenth-century statutes revealed noble efforts to retain this cultural tradition. They represented a desperate effort to maintain the tradition and heritage which they knew, constantly focusing on the process of the transfering of culture to the young.[18] A 1639 law in Dorchester, Massachusetts, for example, required that the town assess a 20 tax levy each year for payment to the elected schoolmaster.[19] In 1645, Dorchester established rules and regulations for the election of three wardens of the school, "the first board of trustees of its kind in the world."[20] In 1647, the Act of the Massachusetts General Court required all towns in the Massachusetts colony to establish and maintain schools under their control.[21] Later, a missionary fervor, which subsided in the eighteenth century, left an everlasting mark on American life. From henceforth, it injected the conflict of group relations in the divergent societal scenario of education. Education, in this form and characteristic, acquired its position of importance in the rapidly emerging pattern of American denominationalism.[22]

As the colonies entered the eighteenth century, American society became more unstable, more highly mobile, and, more importantly, more heterogeneous. The education they sought and created was an instrument of group action rather than a neutral pedagogy, which could have developed through intrinsic motivation and the drift of intellectual currents.[23] They "set the pattern for control of public education by formulating policy, administering the schools, and planning the curriculum. Essentially, control rested in the lay citizens."[24]

As the number of immigrants increased, so did the heterogeneity. It was this heterogeneous aspect which greatly abetted the development of individualism in American society. As a result of this heterogeneity, "three political cultures [Individualistic, Moralistic, and Traditionalistic] emerged because various ethnic and sectarian groups tended to congregate in the same communities, and because they remained cohesive when they migrated westward, these political cultures became geographically distributed"[25] (A more detailed discussion of the political cultures will follow later in the text). Consequently, schooling bore the onus of defining the uniqueness of the group, of justifying its existence by advancing the view that its practices and interpretations fit within the broad structure of the developing American culture. It was this carefully controlled process of schooling which denominational leaders hoped would perpetuate the group's existence and culture into the future. Moreover, education was so central to their purposes that their existence depended on it. To them, the control of education was to remain in their hands. Their greatest apprehension was that the schools would attain institutional

autonomy which would free it from its initiating purposes. And, because these denominations financed their own schools, they were able to remain in the cultural mainstream.[26]

From a broader perspective, the American economy was in its infancy. Subsequently, the financing of schools was tenuous due to a lack of surplus wealth. Because land endowments were the practice, if not the main staple of educational finance in Europe, the tradition of land endowments to the schools continued because there was an abundance of land in America. However, the profits derived from land lay in the future.[27] Communities sought newer and more reliable forms of revenue to finance the type of education desired by the colonists but neither would suffice. Subsequently, a solution emerged in New England circa 1750--the pooling of community resources via general taxation--that did not appear everywhere. As this movement failed, the economic foundation for self-direction in education failed to develop.[28] What is important in this aspect of educational finance is that, during the early formative years, schooling at all levels came within the direct control of not only those responsible for instruction, but of those who had created and maintained the institutions. As the American economy approached maturity, traditional, older forms of finance made external control of education possible.[29]

As America entered the chaotic years of independence from the British Crown, politics became the tenor of the times. It was at this time that communities sought to relegate politics from the educational scene. "The forces shaping education had never been closely related to the higher political organizations; they had, in fact, grown up in

deliberate opposition to them."[30] So staunch were the communities in their views of politics and the schools that popular control survived the war and political changes; the events of the times actively confirmed their outlook.[31]

After winning its independence from the Crown, British America became the United States of America. In a little less than 150 years, the American culture developed and evolved rapidly--the population was doubling every 25 years. So individualistic was the culture that the citizens of the neonation could not even agree among themselves. The culture was a component of Atlantic civilization, closely associated with England, yet different in essential ways. It was provincial, drawn between the attraction of cosmopolitan urbanity and native pragmatism; it was equally disdainful of decadence and rusticity.[32] As "part of and ancient civilization, it was fresh, naive, aspiring, and acutely self-conclous."[33]

As America entered a new era, it lost much, if not all, of its homogeneous character. "A process whose origins lay in the half-instinctive workings of a homogeneous, integrated society was transformed in the jarring multiplicity, the raw economy, and the barren environment of America."[34] Hence, as a social function, education's role in society was redefined as a result of increased heterogeneity and the multiplication of competing, conflicting groups during the eighteenth century.[35] Dominant groups deliberately used schooling as an instrument to establish an ideal unity while the minority groups struggled to retain their identity for the future. Even the Court "endorsed the right of initiating groups to control what they created, to gain from the state equal privileges with all

other groups and to retain them even against the state itself."[36] The newly formed states sought greater control of schooling. They did not view any educational activity as entirely "private," especially in the secondary schools and universities, where "its force was manifest in its exclusive capacity to license teaching and to bestow the legal immunities of incorporation."[37] As a result of the denominational complexity in eighteenth-century America, the minority groups sought to neutralize the state, to deny its right to an interest superior above all others, and to create from its benefits not privileges but rights.

The eighteenth-century Americans considered education to be the proper responsibility of the state, a state whose role was positive and neutral, and expressing an "interest apart from the particular concerns of groups within the population."[38] In Connecticut, for example, the Acts of 1795 and 1799 almost entirely removed the responsibility for supporting schools from the community and delegated it to the state. Connecticut was one of the first states to establish a permanent school fund; participation at this time was still optional as in New York.[39] Pennsylvania's constitution of 1790 provided free education only to the unchurched poor who could not afford the tuition payments at the more prestigious schools. Free schooling, then, became a charitable institution. It also placed the stigma of pauper upon those who sent their children to the free schools.[40]

The nineteenth-century Americans "confronted the inappropriateness of traditional European organizational arrangements,"[41] searching for a suitable compromise that reconciled the form and context of social life while mitigating the fear of

strong government. Distrusting strong government because of its European overtones, nineteenth-century voters curtailed governmental powers and expenditures in a number of domains.[42] Yet, "they used government as a means of creating the most extensive network of public schools in the world."[43] Further, "public education emerged gradually during the nineteenth century as, in effect, a fourth branch of state government, different from the other branches in important ways, though dependent on them as well."[44] Not only had education become a part of the state's administrative bureaucracy but also a venture fully vested with ideological underpinnings, locally administered and supervised by the state.[45]

Between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, academies were the predominant institutions of secondary education throughout the infant country, which proved to be an important development in the concept of local control. During the early nineteenth century, there emerged a vague dichotomy between public and private schooling. "In the early republican period, 'public' implied the performance of broad social functions and the service of a large, heterogeneous, nonexclusive clientele rather than control and ownership by the community or state."[46]

Because of the vague dichotomy which emerged between public and private, "English co-denominationalists of all major religious groups in America gave political and financial aid to educational endeavors in America."[47] This not only exacerbated the problem of the unchurched poor but also increased interdenominational bickering, which eventually led to a move towards the establishment of a single

nonsectarian educational agency.[48] This marked the first thrust towards educational reorganization.

This controversy over educational reorganization reflected an even broader controversy over the shape of society. This debate, as it were, centered on objective questions such as organizational structure and organizational purpose. The focus of dispute was the degree of standardization which American institutional forms would tolerate.[49] "Formerly a matter of family and community, education became caught up in an expanding polity and its unifying and conflicting conceptions of purpose."[50] Further, as local communities attempted to reaffirm their own autonomy, constitutional and legal norms reflected the values of an expanding state.[51] Hence, finance, professionalism, size, and control became the primary issues of controversy.[52]

Because of the inherent distrust of a strong central government, the colonists delegated the responsibility of schooling to the townships. Even before they ratified the Constitution, the Congress of the Confederation passed the Ordinance of 1785 which states in part:

> There shall be reserved the Lot No. 16 of every township for the maintenance of public schools, within said township.[53]

To encourage settlement of the western lands, Congress then passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which gave to the newly formed states section 16 of every township. In 1803, Congress enacted legislation which provided that control of this land be vested in the legislature of the state. Between 1802 and 1848, 12 states entered the Union with this

grant.[54] Through land grants, "Congress subsidized and stimulated the formation of common schools."[55]

Because of the transplantation and transformation of English culture, education was, by necessity, an important facet of American society. To continue this outgrowth of American culture, local taxation became a customary practice to support public schools, which led individual states admitted into the Union to follow the example set by the colonial towns.[56]

As the settlers began to learn the business of managing the affairs of government in the states, "the only right recognized as belonging to the state was the right to grant the townships permission to tax themselves."[57] Only after permissive taxation had existed for a while could states enact legislation for compulsory taxation for schools. In 1812, for example, New York required each town to raise a tax equal to its full share but left participation in the revenue to the option of the towns. However, since participation in the public funds was optional, many towns rejected the public money. Consequently, the New York legislature enacted a law making local taxation and participation compulsory. As such, local taxation became a necessity for supporting free schools because rate bills depended upon student attendance.[58]

Because free schools were becoming predominant, "public sentiment respecting the establishing and maintaining of free schools ranged all the way from indifference, disbelief, and contempt, to open hostility." Further, taxation for the purpose of providing teachers' wages was considered not only a burden but an imposition. In Indiana, for example, there were no free schools between 1830 and 1840. Free schools in the South were regarded as charity schools.[59]

In Pennsylvania, "laws enacted in 1834 and 1836 left the establishment of public schools to the option of the individual districts."[60] Prior to 1834 and in the period between 1834 and 1848, tuition fees formed the basis by which many districts supported their schools. However, "after 1834, any public schools maintained by districts [had to] be absolutely free."[61]

Because taxation for the support of public schools was becoming more difficult to administer at the local level, many states created permanent common school funds by selling the public lands granted to them in the Northwest Ordinance. These permanent common school funds served as the first stable source of financial support of free schools in America.[62]

With the sale of these lands, "states learned to use their common school funds as stimuli to local communities to build schools and as levers to secure compliance with state regulations."[63] States typically used the income from the permanent school funds for the support and maintenance of public schools.[64] In 1863, Minnesota specified that the county school fund be used for teachers' wages while "districts were to raise, by voluntary, self-imposed taxes, [monies] for building and furnishing school houses."[65]

The nineteenth-century Americans saw more states establish permanent common school funds as well as the move for educational reforms gain momentum. The progressive movement in schooling reflected concerns with political and economic considerations rather than concerns for the children.[66] The political/economic considerations entailed methods of management as well as changes in legislation. The ultimate implicit goal was to create an extensive system of common schools which

would create social unity by blurring the cultural distinctiveness of a heterogeneous society.[67]

To create this extensive system of schools, the reformers focused their pedagogical plans on changing an impassive, intellectual education to one of affective cultivation. To this end, schooling had to be universal.[68] Their plans included centralization, which consisted of two components, and compulsory attendance.

The centralists met with great opposition. "Traditions of localism remained strong, and the centralizers had great difficulty securing compliance with state law."[69] Further, the reformers stressed the "elements of concensus and forces leading toward centralization . . . for education was a domain in which growing agreement over purpose coexisted with sharp disagreement over means."[70] As a first step toward state control, centralization was a crucial element in the process that persuaded Americans that schooling was a "legitimate public service even while arguing over the proper locus of control and means of finance."[71]

The first stage of centralization entailed the replacement of the district boards by one central board of education. Opponents found the concept of a central board was tantamount to a monopoly of power in a few hands, contrary to the spirit of democracy.[72] They felt that "each individual school should be under the control of a community composed merely of the number of families having children in it."[73] In short, responsiveness, close public control, and local involvement were more important than organizational efficiency.

Nonetheless, "local decision makers often chose to ignore the legal framework. Many school trustees were more responsive to what they thought the local people wanted and believed than they were to state

laws."[74] In 1840, "democratic localists" in Massachusetts advocated abolition of the state's Board of Education stating that its supervisory powers would eventually become regulatory because of its proximity to the legislature. Further, the impending threat of a state educational apparatus was tantamount to the imposition of social change and attitudes upon the people. The strength of democratic localism lay in the faith in people as the souce of social change and progress. Also, they stressed that a local system option could adapt to the educational needs and wishes of the people. The fallibility in their premise was their failure to recognize the critical differences between the rural and urban contexts.[75]

In the early half of the nineteenth century, local trustees hired the teachers and chose the textbooks they wanted in the early stages of most state school systems.[76] In essence, "everyday decision-making in public education, as in many other public affairs, was in the hands of local officials, both lay trustees and professional leaders."[77] Public schooling was the largest enterprise at the local level, consisting of hundreds of thousands of paid teachers and administrators. In rural school districts, the trustees decided whom to hire, where and what type of school to build, determined the length of the school year, with some state guidance, how much local tax to levy to supplement state funds, and what to teach.[78]

The second facet of centralization involved the grading of schools, carefully designed sequences of schools with high schools at the apex and specialist teachers in a number of subjects. This method of schooling was contrary to the district system in which one teacher taught children of all ages in one room. The reformers viewed the

graded system as more efficient and more effective than the district system. As a result, the initial establishment of high schools in most states preceded enabling and compulsory legislation. For example, in 1827, Massachusetts enacted a law requiring towns of certain size to maintain a high school; in 1849, Pennsylvania enacted enabling legislation; and in 1856, Wisconsin enacted its first enabling laws.[79]

In addition to graded schools, this facet also included raising the stature of teaching to a profession. To achieve this status, teachers had to attend normal schools for preparation via professional instruction.[80] The reformers sought permanence, personal responsibility, and continuous systematic labor. To make such an enterprise operate efficiently and honestly, they recommended the employment of a superintendent, "an adequately paid, tenured, full-time administrator."[81]

The Industrial Revolution brought to America changes in not only the standard of living but also in the management of public business. Corporations, operated by self-perpetuating boards of directors, were autonomous, aided but not controlled by the state, and best served the public interest. This style of management pervaded the public education scenario at the secondary and higher education, academy, and college level.[82] Particularly appealing in this concept of management was the "congruence between the flexibility of essentially private institutions and the variability of American conditions."[83] Moreover, the freedom from governmental interference gave parents the right to select their child's schooling as an expression of their individuality. Such a system of educational management reflected the sensitive, personal, and cultural idiosyncrasies. It offered disinterested, enlightened,

continuous management as well as institutional variety, flexibility, and adaptation to local circumstances without the stigma of pauper.[84]

The demise of this style of management came with the redefinition of "public school." Reformers stated that only those institutions which the public established, financed (chiefly or entirely), controlled, and accessed upon egalitarian terms without tuition would merit the definition.[85] Further, "population growth and heterogeneity made extremely decentralized administration inefficient in an urban setting."[86]

As industrialization increased in momentum, the schools bore an added onus by serving as the training ground for commerce. The schools would now have to transform agrarian habits into those consonant with city life.[87] Reformers viewed the growth of cities as a detriment to the advancement of civilization. The schools were the keys to uplifting the quality of city life and concomitantly halting poverty, crime, and immorality.[88]

Industrial values reflected an obsession with professionalism and systems. One of the first problems of the schools was ensuring the regular attendance of all children in a prolonged, systematic, and carefully structured form of formal instruction. The sentiment was to reward a man for his abilities rather than for who he was. The elaborate architectures, curricula, and pedagogies that the reformers proposed for school systems sought to supplant ascription with achievement.[89] "Graded schools, regulated promotions, and trained staff were designed to counter problems created by a populace accustomed to gaining privileges by means that had little to do with the capacity to perform."[90]

Because modernizing societies require a commitment to competence, the transition from a pre-industrial society requires a shift in social valuation from ascription to achievement, unlike traditional societies with well-defined roles and rigid social structures. Reformers stated that the schools must be politically and religiously neutral albeit the Protestant ethic pervaded the early history of the common school. The dilemma rested in attempting to honor minority notions while inculcating the required norms of society.[91]

By 1850, the cry for compulsory education increased in magnitude. In 1851, Massachusetts passed the first general compulsory-education law. Because compulsory education was seen as a duty of the taxpayer, compulsory taxation eliminated the freedom to be unschooled.[92] "If everyone was taxed for school support, . . .then, clearly, education had to be compulsory."[93]

Administration during the 1850s and 1860s posed the greatest problems to the urban schools because of the increased complexity.[94] By 1870, city high schools were generally big enough to permit the division of students by grade.[95] "Superintendents spoke hopefully of reducing class size to 60 per teacher."[96] School budgets mounted and school boards grew to the unwieldy sizes of 50, 70, to more than 100 members resulting in rampant corruption and irresponsibility. Politics permeated almost every facet of public education from teaching and administrative posts to textbook contracts.[97] In short, the 1870s saw a focus on the cost and quality of education.[98] "For roughly two decades, schoolmen were able to carry on the task of consolidation with a minimum of lay interference."[99]

The bureaucratization of American urban education altered the relationship between the school and the community. As the organization of urban education increased in complexity, the schools increasingly divorced themselves from the communities they served. Laymen had progressively less power to influence school policy.[100] "By 1880, the basic features of public education in most major cities were the same as they are today."[101]

By 1886, "nearly all states provided legally for a state superintendent, local school trustees, a public school fund, local (county or tonwship) school taxes, teacher certification, and a defined school age"[102] (see Table 1). Table 1 depicts the trends in constitutional provisions for public education with regards to the aforementioned areas. As one can readily see, as states entered the Union, the number of constitutional prescriptions increased. Moreover, some states revised their provisions to coincide with the tenor of the times. For example, when Louisiana entered the Union in 1812, it made no constitutional provisions for public schooling. However, by 1868, the Louisiana constitution provided for a state superintendent, land grants, a permanent common school fund, and state taxes for supporting public schools. Thirty-four states recognized the importance of improving the skills of teachers and, subsequently, specified the qualifications for entering the profession. In addition, almost all states prescribed the subjects taught in the schools and decided by law who should select textbooks.[103] To receive state funds, "local districts typically had to comply with certain minimal requirements, such as keeping schools open for a certain term, hiring only certified teachers, and submitting records to the state superintendent."[104]

Table 1. State Constitutional Provisions for Public Education

State	Year	State Supt.	State Board	County Supt.	Land Grants	School Fund	State Taxes	Nonsect.	Purpose
KY	1792								
TN	1796								
OH	1802				x				x
LA	1812								
IN	1816				x	x			x
MS	1817								x
IL	1818								
AL	1819				x	x			x
ME	1819								x
MO	1820				x	x			x
MI	1835	x			x	x			x
AR	1836				x				x
FL	1838				x	x			
RI	1842					x			x
IA	1846	x			x	x			x
WI	1848	x			x	x		x	
CA	1849	x			x	x			x
KA	1855	x			x	x		x	
MN	1857				x	x	x		x
OR	1857	x			x	x			
WV	1863	x			x	x	x		x
NV	1864	x			x	x	x	x	x
NE	1866-7					x		x	
AL	1867	x	x		x	x	x		
MD	1867					x	x		
AR	1868	x			x	x	x	x	x
FL	1868	x	x		x	x	x		
GA	1868	x					x		
LA	1868	x			x	x	x		
MS	1868	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
NC	1868	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
SC	1868	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
TX	1868	x			x	x	x		
VA	1870	x	x	x	x	x	x		
CO	1876	x	x	x	x	x		x	
ID	1889	x	x		x	x		x	x
MT	1889	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
ND	1889	x		x	x	x		x	x
SD	1889	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
WA	1889	x			x	x	x	x	x
WY	1889	x	x		x	x	x	x	
UT	1895	x	x		x	x		x	
OK	1907	x	x	x	x	x		x	
AZ	1912	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
NM	1912	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	

Source: David Tyack, and Thomas James, "State Government and American Public Education: Exploring the 'Primeval Forest,'" History of Education Journal, 26:39-71, Spring, 1986, p. 56.

In essence, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, most legal frameworks for governing became more similar, complex, and prescriptive.[105] Further, "public education was universal, tax-supported, free, compulsory, and bureaucratically arranged."[106] Moreover, to perfect their organizational hierarchies, the schoolmen introduced the concepts of tenure and pensions.[107]

Centralizing control "over such matters as textbooks, teacher certification, the use of English as the language of instruction, and compulsory attendance also led to conflict between the layers of government."[108] Teachers, like other occupational groups, sought to control access to the profession via licensing requirements. Administrative leaders in public education, unlike doctors and lawyers, sought to achieve greater bureaucratization, believing that the creation of more buffers against lay control would yield greater autonomy. Simultaneously, educators opposed those state laws which they regarded as hostile to their incipient professionalization.[109]

The 1920s saw an increase in the number of compulsory attendance laws. After 1928, 42 states had laws to at least the age of 16. However, the laws were basically ineffective because of criteria for exemptions and exceptions.[110]

Between 1928-1939, 24 states levied real and general property taxes, which served as the main sources of school finance. In 1933, states earmarked general sales taxes for public school support. In addition, the number of laws prescribing equalization funds increased after 1919. However, there was a reversal of the trend of earmarking certain tax revenues for public school support.[111]

During this period, there was also a movement for increasing the minimum qualifications for teacher certification from at least two years of post-high school preparation to four years. Five states had already done so. In addition, between 1929 and 1939, there was a legislative trend towards securing permanent tenure for teachers where there was no legislation provided and extending tenure protection to smaller towns and rural districts in those states where legislation covered only those teachers in metropolitan areas.[112]

During the 1940s, a number of states provided continuing contracts.[113] Also, 15 states liberalized their tenure laws to include larger areas. Teacher retirement systems improved as a result of amendments which, in general, permitted retired teachers to return to the schools for the duration and gave service credit to members on military leave.[114] In addition to teacher retirement legislation, 26 states also enacted state minimum salary standards or schedules.[115] Some either fixed the minimum salary or directed the state board of education to do so. In 20 states, legislation fixed minimum salaries while the state board fixed the minimum salaries in six. Moreover, 11 states introduced salary schedules, which guaranteed annual increments based upon years of experience. Nine schedules based their increases upon level of preparation; in two, on the size of the district and type of school. Also, in all but one of the 26 minimum-salary standards, the states allowed local boards to pay higher salaries from local funds than the required state minimum.[116]

The Forties also saw the advent of minimum or foundation programs, aid provided by the state to local school districts on the basis of carefully developed measures of need and ability. States measured this

ability, or effort, as the yield of a specified number of mills from a tax rate levied on the property of the local school district.[117]

The 1950s saw an intense move for consolidation which decreased the number of school districts from 127,244 in 1933 to 60,416 in 1955. The Central states showed the sharpest reductions with Illinois trimming the number of school districts from 11,061 between 1946 and 1947 by almost 9,000; Texas eliminated more than 2,000.[118] The reasoning for this was to increase efficiency in instruction and apportionments. While the consolidation movement intensified, the public schools saw a deficiency in teachers in light of rising enrollments. Solutions suggested ranged from the shortening of periods of education by the introduction of double sessions, extending the school year to a triquarter system and concomitantly staggering enrollments, reorganizing the curriculum, eliminating one or more grade levels to increasing the class size beyond the 25:1 or 30:1 ratio.[119]

State finance programs included, in general, an increase in foundation programs, minimum local effort, per pupil/teacher apportionment, and equalization funding.[120] State financing ranged from 6.3% to 85.6%, the majority of which derived from property tax.[121]

Because enrollments continued to increase at the close of the Fifties, 46 state legislatures enacted laws providing for compulsory attendance in a kindergarten program--40 provided for permissive laws, six provided for mandatory attendance. In addition, 17 states permitted nursery schools.[122]

Furthermore, there was a movement toward the professionalization of state departments of education. This trend involved the selection of the state superintendent where most of the states shifted from

appointment by popular election to appointment by the state board of education.[123] In addition to these changes at the state level, teachers saw the minimum standards for certification increased to a minimum of four years of college preparation and the introduction of teacher certification of degreed persons via additional classwork and student teaching.[124]

The public schools entered the Sixties with many of the same problems that occurred in the previous decade. There was still a shortage of teachers and increasing enrollment. Even the return of married women into the teaching force did not alleviate the teacher-pupil ratio. The problem of instructional space still pervaded the public schools. As a result, state legislatures increased debt limitations for the construction of classrooms.[125]

Property taxes continued as the major source of public school support, which accounted for 54% of the total school revenues, 95% of which local units raised.[126] However, there was a cry from the local and state units for increased federal aid. Congress responded with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the National Defense Education Act.

Other debates ensued. One important argument that surfaced was that of the sectarian/public school conflict. Many parents pushed for the funding of sectarian and parochial schools. Others decried the separation of church and state.[127] Another extremely sensitive issue that exacted an enormous amount of attention was that of desegregation and its enforcement.[128]

Alongside these societal dilemmas, professional issues plagued the public schools as well. Parents expected and demanded higher-quality

education; teachers demanded more benefits, became more militant, and struck with increasing frequency.[129] There was also strong support for strengthening the state school office by adding professional educators. Teachers saw increased use of audiovisual materials and curricular changes.

The public schools entered the Seventies beleaguered with the continuing problems of the Sixties. Teachers advocated and received collective bargaining rights from several states.[130] Another issue affecting teachers was that of reductions in force due to dropping enrollments. Teachers found this trend particularly threatening because of its effect on teacher tenure statutes.[131] There was also a trend towards administrative unionism.[132]

One of the more significant changes that the public schools experienced in the Seventies occurred in finance. Landmark decisions by the California Supreme Court, in Serrano (1971), and by the Supreme Court, in Rodriguez (1976) and Levittown (1978), created a situation that forced state legislatures to take another look at their school finance methodologies.[133]

At the local level, there was an increase in taxpayer revolt[134], an increase in failing bond issues[135], changes in school governance, and increased changes in curricula. Changes in the curricula entailed a "back to basics" movement and the use of the basic skills as a pre-requisite for graduation. Furthermore, because of Public Law 94-142, local units were required to provide individualized instructional programs for handicapped students.[136] States had to adjust prescribed courses of study to implement bilingual programs prescribed by federal enactment.[137] In addition, there was strong sentiment expressed for

state funding of nonpublic schooling.[138] Lastly, the schools experienced an increase in the number of educational malpractice suits.[139]

The public schools have seen even more drastic changes in the Eighties. One of the more wrenching changes emerged in California with the passing of Proposition 13.[140] This taxpayer revolt was a result of inexorable increases in property taxation to finance the schools and taxpayer disgust with their performance. The passage of this law underscored a national concern for quality education without the concomitant cost.[141] The concern revolved around the input-output dilemma that has pervaded public schooling since their appearance.[142] Moreover, the Federal government curtailed its expenditures in public education. By revising current laws, the Federal government distributed financial aid to the schools in the form of block grants; however, there were fewer funds appropriated to the states by Congress.[143] These forms of grants were categorical in that 80% had to 'pass through' the states to local education agencies while the states retained the remaining 20% for state programs.[144]

Financial issues aside, others continued, and yet others resurrected. The controversy of creationism, for example, began in the 1920s, was resurrected in the 1960s, and received 'equal time' in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[145] Between 1980 and 1981, parents pushed for minimum competency testing of students for diagnostics rather than as a requirement for graduation. In addition, there was a concern for teacher competency.[146] Later, the cry for teacher competence grew louder, leading to minimum competency testing of teachers and

administrators in some states.[147] Texas serves as an example of this trend with passage of its HB 72 (1986).

Local Control and Political Science

The inclusion of political science, in general, and political culture, specifically, allows one to see how political processes in the states have historically developed and evolved. Moreover, if one views these processes as components of a dynamic system rather than one that is static, then the historical link to these processes becomes an integral aspect of the system.

Local control is a concept of federalism which communities adapted to the schools. However, the notion remains the same, whether it is applied to a community or education. "Each community has acted in and for itself in appropriating just such parts of the common heritage as were adapted to its peculiar conditions and previous experience. This is the distinctive American method of social growth and betterment."[148]

The development of political theory and educational political theory is rare and infrequent. If theories are implements for analyzing and dependably comprehending how political systems operate, it seems that scarcity prevails.[149] The conceptual transformation of the tasks and functions of theory does not involve the rejection or discarding of theory or, for that matter, the addition of new dimensions to the historical concerns of theory but, rather, emphasizes those concerns which time and neglect have left unattended within traditional theory. Consequently, descriptive theory promises an exponential rate of development as opposed to the results from squeezing theory into an intellectual mold. In developing his systems analysis of political

life, Easton posits constructs which will prove viable to the current research.

Easton defines a political community as "a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor."[150] The intent of narrowing the focus is not to concentrate on the form of the structure of processes but on the group of members who congregate by the fact of participating in a common structure and set of processes. "The concept 'community' refers not to a quality of a common set of relationships but to a different set of relationships entirely. Each set must exist in every social group."[151] Because this focus accounts for the heterogeneity of cultures and traditions of the group members involved in a political system, group members need not demonstrate the same degree of cohension. Essentially, "a group of people who come together to draw up some kind of constitution to regulate their political relationship--as in the case of the 13 colonies in America--thereby indicate their intention to share a division of political labor."[152] Hence, the political community is theoretically an analytic concept, referring not to the total human being but to a facet of his political behavior.[153]

All political communities possess some degree of a sense of community. Easton states that this sense of community, or the "feeling" of belonging together as a group, exists when a group of persons not only shares a political structure but also shares a political fate. Thus, a variance of customs, religion, traditions, cultures, and socioeconomic status will determine the feeling of political community and, ultimately, extent of participation in the common political unit.[154]

Every political community consists of three components which constrain political interaction: values (goals and principles); norms; and an authoritative structure. Values define the periphery of the political community with regard to daily policy without provoking resentment from important segments of the community. Norms stipulate the expected and accepted procedures for processing and implementing demands. The authoritative structure delineates the distribution of power resources, formally and informally, for making and implementing decisions. Hence, these three components both delimit and validate political actions and, essentially, establish the pattern for political interactions. However, apparently static political communities and their components are dynamic, adapting continuously to changing conditions. Those which fail to adapt will experience a coup d'etat that may modify or destroy them. Consequently, a political community at any moment in time represents the adaption to pressures for new goals, regulations, or structures induced by social change and the conventions. Support for the system, therefore, supersedes support, or the lack thereof, for values, norms, and structure.[155]

Historically, separatist groups have sought a separate identity via mastery of their own political destiny as a result of the nexus which exists between the level of political conciousness and organization, and maintenance and gratification of a sense of dignity. Sharing of the political division of labor is contingent upon language, religion, common history, or race, resulting in a desire for identity as a separate political community. Consequently, the members may dispute among themselves without tearing the fabric of their community. Thus, in acquiring sentiments of mutual identification, members adapt their

behaviors to ensure the perpetuation of themselves as a cohesive group.[156]

A sense of community, to some extent, emerges as a consequence of common history and related shared traditions and expectations. This feeling represents the group's past experiences, transmitted across the generations. Subsequently, an ideology performs the function of interpreting and codifying this feeling in a form which is readily visible, accessible, and transmissable to future generations of the political community.[157]

There appear to be three different types of ideologies which members of a political community may have. However, each type of ideology comprises a more general ideology, i.e., every person has a dominant ideology with tendencies towards the other ideologies. These ideologies are partisan, legitimating, and communal.[158]

A partisan ideology refers to those beliefs which organize opinion about the types of daily policies that political authorities should pursue.[159]

A legitimating ideology relates to those beliefs which direct support or challenge to the political community and the right of the authorities to govern. It consists of principles and values for validating a structure, its norms, and participants based upon the transcience of time, envisioning the future, interpreting the present, and pondering the past.[160]

Lastly, a communal ideology concerns the permanence or alteration of the political community. Advocates of this ideology express as well as reinforce a sense of political unity among the members of a group

sharing a common set of values, structures, and norms for political purposes.[161]

Studying state governments provides various "useful perspectives on the politics of schooling and the ideology and structure of public education."[162] One should not correlate the similarity of legal frameworks between states with homogeneity of actual practice. The "states differed greatly in their geography, demography, economy, historical tradition, and political culture."[163]

Because the 50 states comprise separate political communities within a much greater political community, their predominant ideologies influence the shape of their individual political structures. Moreover, three overarching factors seem to affect these structures: political culture, sectionalism, and frontier.[164]

Political culture is that pattern of orientation which establishes the political system of each state. Its importance rests in its historical significance as the source of habits, concerns, and attitudes that influence political life in the states.[165] Political culture, as with all culture, derives from the cumulative historical experiences of particular groups of people. In fact, "the origins of particular patterns of political culture are often lost in the mists of time."[166] Further, patterns of political culture often envelop several political systems; two or more political cultures may cohabit the same system.

Sectionalism, not regionalism, is that arrangement which binds groups of contiguous states or portions of states that share similar economic and social interests. Sectionalism serves as a major source of geographical variation that influences intrastate differences in response to national political, economic, and social developments.[167]

Lastly, there is the expansive frontier, the persistent American effort to control the natural environment for the benefit of humanity and the subsequent periodic reorganization of American social and settlement patterns which resulted from the impact of that effort. These three factors operate dynamically rather than in a static manner and interact with each other. According to Elazar, these three factors shape the thrusts that influence American politics.[168]

The national political culture itself is a conglomerate of three major political subcultures. Each of the these subcultures cooperatively inhabits the country, existing concurrently or even imbricating one another. Through the transcience of time, each has proportionally dispersed itself from coast to coast. Moreover, they represent migratory patterns of different ethnicities to specific sections of the country in rather ordered patterns. Each culture has different centers of emphasis. The three political cultures are individualistic (I), moralistic (M), and traditionalistic (T). However, Elazar indicates that these categories are descriptive and not evaluative in nature. Moreover, their intent is for their use as models of ideal types not entirely extant in the real world.[169]

The individualistic political culture (I) views democracy as a marketplace, i.e., government is a creature of the people designed for utilitarian reasons to manage the demands of the people it serves. It emphasizes centralization of private concerns while delimiting community intervention in private activities.[170]

Because the individualistic political culture views politics as just another tool by which members may improve themselves socially and

economically, it is just as much a business as any other that competes for talent by providing rewaqrds to those who make it a career.[171]

Personal relationships based upon a system of mutual obligations describe political life in the I political culture. Because I political cultures tend towards complexity, political parties harness this system of mutual obligations by acting as "'business corporations.'"[172]

Since the I political culture conceives of politics as a "business," it is only for professionals and not the common layman. Further, it expects a fair amount of corruption and does not concern itself with the professionals' credentials.[173]

Public officials will only initiate new programs or areas of government activity when they perceive an overwhelming public demand for them to act. Essentially, the nucleus of political relationships is the quid pro quo system with new services a reward to the public as an exchange for placing them in office.[174]

Bureaucracy is neither a hindrance nor an impetus. Only those seeking to master the market will use the virtues of organizational efficiency. Nonetheless, organizations function within the framework of the favor system.[175]

The moralistic political culture (M) places emphasis on the concept of commonwealth as the foundation of democratic government. To the M political culture, politics is not a business but, rather, one of the great activities of humanity in its quest for the good society. The struggle for power is for the exercise of that power for the improvement of the commonwealth. Citizens measure good government by the degree to which it will promote the public welfare and in terms of the integrity, altruism, and commitment to serve of those in power.[176]

In the M political culture, there is a general commitment to communalism in lieu of individualism. It espouses the use of this communal power to intercede in "'private'" activities for the public good or the welfare of the community. Issues in the M style of politics set the tone for political concern. Hence, citizens see government as a positive instrument for promoting the general welfare, although the definitions of this responsibility vary from era to era.[177]

For example, M styles of government will not support federal aid for urban renewal but, at the same time, will not delimit community responsibility for urban redevelopment. Essentially, the implicit distinction is between legitimate community responsibility and central government encroachment, i.e., "'communalism'" versus "'collectivism.'" Hence, M governments may tolerate, if not prefer, governmental intervention in the social realm--censorship or the screening of books and movies--as well as in the economy.[178]

Because the M political culture views the existence of politics as the means for dealing with the issues and concerns of civil society, it advocates the precept that politics is the responsibility of every citizen to participate in the affairs of government and not just the professional politician.[179]

As a result, citizens place moral obligations upon those who participate in government that are more demanding than those of the marketplace because government service is public service. Moreover, the political arena is not the place for private economic enrichment.[180]

Serving the community forms the basis of the political relationship. Loyalty to the community must come before friendship. Subsequently, adherence to party lines is of little import. Citizens

view the political party as a useful device but do not value it for its own sake.[181]

In terms of bureaucracy, the M political culture has an inherent difficulty in reconciling its communitarian principles with the necessity of large-scale organizations to increase efficiency. In general, though, there is no problem with a politically neutral administrative system.[182]

The traditionalistic political culture (T) reflects an attitude of ambivalence towards the marketplace and an elitist, paternalistic notion of commonwealth. In essence, this older, precommercial attitude sees society as a hierarchy, a part of the natural order. It expects those in the upper echelons of the social structure to take an especially dominant role in government. Although the T political culture accepts government as having a positive role, it restricts that role to maintaining the status quo. To do this, it confines political power in the hands of a small, self-perpetuating group of established elites whose "right" to govern derives from family ties or social status.[183]

As such, social and family relationships form the basis of the T political culture. These relationships are much more important than the personal relationships in the individualistic culture, where a person's first obligation is to himself. Moreover, those in power do not expect citizens without a definite role in politics to actively participate. In most cases, they do not even expect citizens to vote![184]

Political parties are of little import in the T political culture because they encourage the development of an open system, contrary to the fundamental grain of an elitist political order. Their main function, however, is to recruit people for the less-desirable formal

government positions. Consequently, political systems within this culture tend towards loose one-party systems, if any.[185]

Maintenance and support for traditional patterns and, when required, adapting to varying conditions with the least amount of disorder mark good government. In essence, political leaders tend towards conservative and custodial roles rather than initiating roles unless the public pressures them for changes.[186]

The evolution of public education in each state is directly related to the establishment of the political cultures in each state. Further, because the various ethnicities and religious sects tended to congregate in the same areas, the geographical distributions of political patterns are a result of the settlement trends during the westward migration. The sectional concentrations of unique cultural groups have aided in the creation of societal interests that have united the contiguous states while simultaneously creating marked difference in standard measures of similarity.[187]

For example, the Southern states share a common characteristic although they have great material differences, such as Virginia and Mississippi or Florida and Arkansas. In like fashion, there are distinctions in New England with Maine and Massachusetts or Connecticut and Vermont. One can trace these sectional concentrations for every part of the nation, noting the effects on the character of economic interests shared by the states in each section.[188]

The transience of time and wrenching changes have eroded some cultural patterns, intensified others, and modified still others,making each local situation increasingly complex (see Figure 1).[189]



Figure 1. Patterns of Political Culture Within the States.

Source: Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 97.

The distinctiveness of the political system in the United States derives from the amalgamation of the three political cultures. Each contributes an important facet to the American political system, yet, each also has immanently precarious aspects to the survival of the system.[190]

For example, the M political culture serves as the driving force for the continuous quest for the good society but tends towards fanaticism and narrowmindedness. The I political culture tolerates flagrant political corruption but has provided the framework for integrating the diversity of ethnic and religious sects into the American mainstream. The T political culture strives for continuity in a dynamic society but will deny Blacks their civil rights for the sake of continuity.[191]

Peculiar collections of cultural patterns are distinctly distinguishable within every state. It is these patterns that give each state its unique character and allow for determining the conduct of its fundamental relationship, as a state, to the nation (see Figure 2). By and large, the T political culture dominates the states of the greater South; the I political culture dominates those states, in a southwesterly direction, that stretch across the middle section of the nation; and the M political culture is eminent in those states of the far North, Northwest, and Pacific Coast (see Table 2).[192]

Voter turnout is a measure of citizen participation and the basis for the varying inclinations of the particular political cultures in the 50 states. Obviously, those people who see the political process as a means for accomplishing something positive will probably be more politically active than those who have little faith in the process.



Figure 2. Dominant Political Cultures by State.

Source: Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 108.

Table 2. State Political Cultures by Section

Section	State	Political culture
Far West	NV	I
	OR	M
	UT	M
	CA	M-I
	ID	M-I
	WA	M-I
	AK	No Data
	HA	No Data
Lower South	MS	T
	SC	T
	AL	T-I
	AR	T-I
	FL	T-I
	GA	T-I
	LA	T-I
Mid-Atlantic	DE	I
	MD	I
	NJ	I
	NY	I
	PA	I
Near West	IL	I
	IN	I
	OH	I
	MI	M
	WI	M
New England	MA	I
	RI	I
	CN	I-M
	ME	M
	VT	M
	NH	M-I
Northwest	NE	I-M
	WY	I-M
	CO	M
	MN	M
	ND	M
	IA	M-I
	KA	M-I
	MT	M-I
	SD	M-I
Southwest	MO	I-T
	OK	T-I
	TX	T-I
	AZ	T-M
	NM	T-M
Upper South	NC	T
	TN	T
	VA	T
	KY	T-I
	WV	T-I

Source: Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 110.

Hence, one would expect M types to be most active, T types the least, and I types vacillating between, depending on the issues involved.[193]

The extent to which localities achieve independence is dependent upon the state, the tenor of the times, and the issues. In all cases, being of vital importance in intrastate political processes, the state-local relationship is a critical variable in a state's civil mechanism within the national political system.[194]

Two basic principles establish the constitutional relationship that exists between the 50 states and their localities. First, in a rigidly legal sense, all local governments are creatures of their respective states. Second, the Court has affirmed that every locality "'is a political subdivision of the state, created as a convenient agency for the exercise of such of the governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to it.'"[195] This subservient status of localities is evident even in states where the local governments existed prior to statehood or acceptance as a territory.[196]

Local communities may develop into political systems. Cities, counties, townships, school districts, and special purpose districts comprise semiformal interrelationships which form the basis of their structures. More precisely, "civil community" describes the network of governments and quasigovernments situated in a locality serving the needs of that locality. A local political system, then, is the sum of all organized political institutions that operate in a locality to supply the bulk of governmental services which the civil community accesses to satisfy local needs with the local value system.[197]

The civil community possesses much more power and, therefore, more autonomy as a political system than any one local government. Although

the civil community has no constitutional basis for existence, it has, nonetheless, etched a place for itself in this constitutional system. Its position depends upon the capability of the formally detached governmental units to satisfy local needs by drawing local and external support which is consonant with the dominant perceptions of the community.[198]

Three crucial points determine the extent to which localities will demonstrate their control over the bulk of local governmental services. First, those localities that demonstrate significant control at any level do so because they have developed as civil communities. For example, local school districts are able to (1) access the fiscal resources of the local governments to support its continuing activities in addition to attracting extraneous funds; (2) use the skills and contacts of their local politicians in the state legislature; (3) acquire endorsement of their plans from community influentials via PTAs; (4) convince the electorate of the value of their services; and (5) share the scope of their interests with public nongovernmental units concerned with public education in the civil community which allows for the development of programs to meet local needs regardless of the source of endorsement.[199]

Second, the success of their control over the sundry governmental agencies depends upon the degree of their organization to exercise that control. Hence, the position they occupy at the state and federal levels depends on the degree of professionalization and bureaucratization they display.[200]

Lastly, the position which the civil community holds in the state's civil society affects its ability to control the assemblage of governmental activities within its perimeter.[201]

Another aspect to consider in this state-local political struggle is that some states espouse traditions of internal centralism while others support localism (see Figure 3).[202] For example, New England has traditionally supported localistic government dating back to the Colonial Period, while the South has traditionally governed centralistically. As a result, it is those states which have avoided intense social pressures for change in the last hundred years that have maintained a localistic tradition. Their state governments have allowed the local subdivisions to bear the brunt of governmental responsibility. The other New England states, as well as the more recent states dominated by Yankee settlements, have modified localism by injecting a degree of centralization. This occurred out of desires to increase the level of state services while concomitantly recognizing the role of the state. In other words, these states involve the state government when necessary, while always retaining the greatest amount of discretion and control at the local level.[203]

The Southern states are a paradox. They have neither relinquished their centralized restraints over their subdivisions nor have they utilized them to expand activities at the state level. Essentially, the Southern states have maintained centralization and minimal activity.[204]

Localism has survived in the middle states longer than in any others because of extreme internal cleavage, especially cleavage in the political culture. This cleavage dictates the limits, resources, and methods of government. As a result, localism is much easier to



Figure 3. Traditions of Centralism-Localism by State.

Source: Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 187.

implement because of the lack of agreement in the administration of statewide programs.[205]

By and large, the states north and west of the Mississippi established their governments after the period of intense localism had transpired. Technological developments served as an impetus for strong state government in the beginning. Subsequently, Iowa and Oregon excepted, these states established their patterns of government exphasizing a strong center at the start. Because of the intense pressure for localism, these states evolved into substantial decentralization and an internal sharing system.[206]

Despite the trend of centralization that has affected all states, attitudes toward centralism and localism have remained as important aspects in each state. Local demands are a function of state tradition.[207]

There seems to be a correlation between state-local relationships, the variable patterns of centralism/localism, and school expenditures. This correlation based on school expenditure patterns is inconclusive, however. For example, in one state, a high degree of local control would result in a high proportion of state expenditure, while in another state, the opposite would be true, i.e., high local expenditures under the aegis of close state supervision.[208]

In New England, pioneers of public schools, the states have supported local responsibility since the advent of public support for schooling. This pattern of finance followed the Yankee migration, although conditions west of the Mississippi necessarily created a need for greater state participation in the financing of public school districts.[209] In the South, public education systems did not exist

until after the Civil War. Controlled by Yankee carpetbaggers, the states were reluctant as well as unable to financially support public education. Just as important, Southern tradition required state-centered governance.[210] In the midsection of the country, the states established their expenditure patterns after the apparent resolution of the political conflict between the localists and centralists.[211]

As a result of the variance in state-local expenditures, it would seem that those states which contribute proportionately more to public education demonstrate either (1) strong centralistic tendencies, or (2) centralized administration/budgetary patterns supported by traditions of decentralization (see Table 3). In Table 3, one can see that 22 states contribute a higher proportion of school expenditures as compared to their localities, thus indicating a tendency towards increased centralization. Twenty states contribute a lower proportion of school expenditures as compared to their localities, indicating a tendency towards decentralization. Using data from 1960, Elazar discovered that the moralistic political culture influenced all but one of the states with proportionate state-local expenditures and also reflected a strong tradition of participation at the local level, resulting in closer parity of fiscal responsibility.[212]

Sharkansky[213] conducted research to quantify Elazar's initial observations and derived a scale of political culture that gave a score to each of the 48 mainland states to test the relationship of the scale to a number of political characteristics.[214] The 23 variables used comprised four categories--Political Participation, Bureaucratic Orientation, Governmental Intervention, and Initiation (see Table 4).[215]

Table 3. Per Capita State School Expenditures in Relation to Local School Expenditures, 1961.

State	Tendency	High	Proportionate	Low
AK	No Data	NA	NA	NA
AL	C	x		
AR	C	x		
AZ	CL			x
CA	CL		x	
CN	LC		x	
CO	CL			x
DE	LC	x		
FL	C	x		
GA	C	x		
HA	No Data	NA	NA	NA
IA	L			x
ID	CL		x	
IL	CL			x
IN	CL			x
KA	LC			x
KY	CL	x		
LA	C	x		
MA	LC			x
MD	CL			x
ME	L			x
MI	LC		x	
MN	LC	x		
MO	CL			x
MS	C	x		
MT	CL			x
NC	C	x		
ND	CL			x
NE	LC			x
NH	L			x
NJ	L			x
NM	C	x		
NV	C	x		
NY	LC	x		
OH	LC			x
OK	C	x		
OR	LC			x
PA	LC	x		
RI	LC		x	
SC	C	x		
SD	CL			x
TN	C	x		
TX	C	x		
UT	CL	x		
VA	C		x	
VT	L			x
WA	CL	x		
WI	LC			x
WV	LC	x		
WY	CL	x		

Source: Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 190.

TABLE 4. Dependent Variables Used in Elazar's Scale of Political Culture.

MEASURES PERTAINING TO PARTICIPATION:

1) Percentage of voting age population voting for Governor
2) Percentage of voting age population voting for U.S. Representatives
3) The number of "facilitating" scores each state received on Milbrath's index of suffrage regulations

MEASURES PERTAINING TO THE SIZE AND PERQUISITES OF THE BUREAUCRACY:

4) Number of state and local government employees per 10,000 population
5) Average salary of state and local government employees
6) Percentage of state and local government employees covered by health and hospital insurance supported in part by government
7) Percentage of state and local government employees covered by life insurance supported in part by government

MEASURES PERTAINING TO THE SCOPE, MAGNITUDE, COSTS, AND INNOVATIVE CHARACTER OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS

8) The percentage of citizens' personal income that is paid in taxes to state and local governments
9) Total state and local government expenditures per capita
10) Percentage of ninth grade students who remain in high school until graduation
11) Percentage of selective service registrants who pass mental examination
12) Total road mileage per capita
13) Total municipal road mileage per urban resident
14) Total rural road mileage per rural resident
15) Percentage of the state's designated Interstate Highway mileage completed by 1962
16) Average payment to recipients of Aid to Families of Dependent children
17) Average payment to recipients of Old Age Assistance
18) Average payment to recipients of Aid to the Blind
19) Average payment to recipients of Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
20) Number of AFDC recipients among population with incomes of less than $2,000
21) Number of OAA recipients among population with incomes of less than $2,000 and over 65 years of age
22) Number of AB recipients among population with incomes of less than $2,000
23) Number of APTD recipients among population with incomes of less than $2,000

Source: Elazar, Daniel J., American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966), pp. 98-9.

Sharkansky notes that "although Elazar's research techniques are admittedly imprecise,"[216] his modified scale and that of Elazar had a simple correlation coefficient of +.92. On the basis of the results of simple correlation, partial correlation, and ANCOVA, Sharkansky concludes that the culture scale appears to be a suitable predictor for certain political traits and may help in the interpretation of state characteristics.[217]

Savage[218] directed research towards the question of multilinear patterns of development to support the Elazar thesis of regionalism. Moreover, the findings "not only substantiate Sharkansky's findings on regionalism but also cast further light on the shifting, multidimensional patterns of political development in the American states."[219] Utilizing data from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Savage concluded that "multilinear evolution is likely to occur where such compatibility is the rule and where the states have had very different early experiences."[220]

Joslyn[221] investigated two possible manifestations of political subcultures to test Elazar's theory concerning subcultural differences in the distribution of adult political attitudes and the content of political communication. Joslyn's research seems to find that "there is considerable variation in the distribution of public across the American states and this variation matches extremely well with the subcultural patterns observed by Elazar.[222] Moreover, Joslyn states that "Elazar has pinpointed a concept that helps us understand the variation in numerous subnational political behaviors."[223]

Wirt[224] directed his efforts at dimensionalizing the concept of local control. He describes the dimensions as (1) the binding nature of

of the center's authority issued as required goals for peripheral units; (2) the degree of specification of that authority by the center; and (3) the presence and specificity of implementation requirements from the center.[225] Using these dimensions, Wirt proceeded to test the crude theory that "control follows the dollar," i.e., to determine if there is a linkage between finances and control in schooling. Wirt discovered that the analytical construct did not explain a great deal of the variance among the states; knowing the states' share of local-schooling costs accounted for only 18% of the variance in state centralization.[226]

To further test the correlation analysis, Wirt used regression analysis. He discovered that the correlation studies indicated that the correlation studies indicated that the higher the state/federal share, the higher the state control. However, this significance faded in the regression analysis to totally dissolve the finance-control link. Wirt concluded that control does not follow the dollar in any linear fashion and that other state qualities mediate this relationship.[227]

To determine these other state qualities, Wirt used the models posited by Elazar and Sharkansky. He discovered that "state control and state money do not run parallel because of the intervening role of political culture."[228] Moreover, Wirt's analysis shows that the values of local control are as diverse as society. These values of local schooling do not derive from the economic substructure. Wealthy and indigent states vary in the degree of authority they exercise over their local schools. In other words, increased state funding does not necessarily denote greater state control or vice versa.[229] Subsequently, "the value of local vs. central control in independent of

measures of a unit's resources, so that we must look elsewhere for explanations of such value variation."[230]

Hanson[231] conducted research to determine the effect of Elazar's political culture scheme on voter turnout. Using interparty competition, political efficacy, and education as variables, Hanson conceded that Elazar correctly identified the basic relationships between political culture, interparty competition, and political efficacy. Moreover, his analyses demonstrated the existence of two relationships: a relatively constant political culture-political efficacy relationship and a structural political culture-interparty competition relationship, thus supporting Elazar's explanation.[232]

Kincaid[233] conducted research to determine the effects of political culture on the quality of life. The results indicated that, in general, there was a stronger relationship between political culture and political, social, health and education, and overall quality-of-life measures than with the economic and environmental measures.[234] Kincaid concluded from his analyses that political culture had pronounced effects as follows:

> (1) A locality has control over behavior or policy as well as a range of choices available;
> (2) Behaviors or policies are salient or threatening to local cultural dispositions;
> (3) Local political culture orientations are homogeneous, intense, and pervasive, and;
> (4) A locality is less affluent and less post-industrial.[235]

Moreover, the results suggest that political culture is an integral aspect in the actual development and administration of public policy (see Table 5).[236]

Ritt[237] investigated the relationship between political culture and political reform. Using Elazar's trichotomy, he found that those states

Table 5. Political Culture Classification of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas.

State	Metropolitan Area	Political Culture
ALABAMA	Birmingham	TI
	Gadsden	T
	Huntsville	TM
	Mobile	T
	Montgomery	T
	Tuscaloosa	T
ARIZONA	Phoenix	MT
	Tucson	TM
ARKANSAS	Ft. Smith (AR-OK)	T
	Little Rock-North Little Rock	T
	Pine Bluff	T
CALIFORNIA	Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove	MI
	Bakersfield	MI
	Fresno	MT
	Los Angeles-Long Beach	MI
	Modesto	IM
	Oxnard-Ventura	MI
	Sacramento	MI
	Salinas-Monterrey	MI
	San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario	MT
	San Diego	MT
	San Francisco-Oakland	IM
	San Jose	IM
	Santa Barbara	MI
	Santa Rosa	MI
	Stockton	IM
	Vallejo-Napa	MI
COLORADO	Colorado Springs	MI
	Denver	MI
	Pueblo	MI
	Steubenville-Weirton (OH-WV)	I
	Toledo (OH-MI)	MI
	Youngstown-Warren	I
CONNECTICUT	Bridgeport	IM
	Bristol	MI
	Danbury	IM
	Hartford	MI
	Meridan	IM
	New Britain	IM
	New Haven	IM
	New London-Groton-Norwich	IM
	Norwalk	MI
	Stamford	MI
	Waterbury	IM
DELAWARE	Wilmington (DE-NJ)	I
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	Washinton (D.C.-MD-VA)	IT
FLORIDA	Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood	TI
	Gainesville	T
	Jacksonville	T
	Miami	TI

Table 5 (continued)

State	Metropolitan Area	Political Culture
	Orlando	T
	Pensacola	T
	Tallahassee	TI
	Tampa-St. Petersburg	TI
	West Palm Beach	TI
GEORGIA	Albany	T
	Atlanta	TI
	Augusta (GA-SC)	T
	Columbus (GA-AL)	TI
	Macon	T
	Savannah	T
HAWAII	Honolulu	TM
IDAHO	Boise (City)	MI
ILLINOIS	Bloomington-Normal	IM
	Champaign-Urbana	I
	Chicago	I
	Decatur	IM
	Peoria	I
	Rockford	M
	Springfield	I
INDIANA	Anderson	I
	Evansville (IN-KY)	IT
	Ft. Wayne	I
	Gary-Hammond-East Chicago	I
	Indianapolis	I
	Lafayette-West Lafayette	I
	Muncie	I
	South Bend	IM
	Terre Haute	I
IOWA	Cedar Rapids	M
	Davenport-Rock Island-Moline	MI
	Des Moines	M
	Dubuque	MI
	Sioux City	M
	Waterloo	M
KANSAS	Topeka	MI
	Wichita	IM
KENTUCKY	Lexington	IT
	Louisville (KY-IN)	IT
	Owensboro	IT
LOUISIANA	Baton Rouge	TI
	Lafayette	TI
	Lake Charles	TI
	Monroe	T
	New Orleans	TI
	Shreveport	T
MAINE	Lewiston-Auburn	I
	Portland	I
MARYLAND	Baltimore	I
MASSACHUSETTS	Boston	IM

Table 5 (continued)

State	Metropolitan Area	Political Culture
	Brockton	IM
	Fall River	IM
	Fitchburg-Leominster	MI
	Lawrence-Haverhill (MA-NH)	IM
	Lowell	IM
	New Bedford	I
	Pittsfield	MI
	Springfield-Chicopee-Holyoke (MA-CT	IM
	Worcester	IM
MICHIGAN	Ann Arbor	MI
	Bay City	MI
	Detroit	MI
	Flint	MI
	Grand Rapids	MI
	Jackson	IM
	Kalamazoo	M
	Lansing	MI
	Muskegon-Muskegon Heights	MI
	Saginaw	I
MINNESOTA	Duluth-Superior	M
	Minneapolis-St. Paul	M
	Rochester	M
MISSISSIPPI	Biloxi-Gulfport	T
	Jackson	T
MISSOURI	Columbia	IT
	Kansas City (MO-KA)	MI
	Springfield	TI
	St. Joseph	I
	St. Louis (MO-IL)	I
MONTANA	Billings	MI
	Great Falls	MI
NEBRASKA	Lincoln	MI
	Omaha	IM
NEVADA	Las Vegas	I
	Reno	I
NEW HAMPSHIRE	Manchester	IM
	Nashua	IM
NEW JERSEY	Atlantic City	I
	Jersey City	I
	Newark	I
	Paterson-Clifton-Passaic	I
	Trenton	I
	Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton	IT
NEW MEXICO	Albuquerque	TM
NEW YORK	Albany-Schenectady-Troy	IM
	Binghamton (NY-PA)	IM
	Buffalo	I
	New York City	I
	Rochester	MI
	Syracuse	IM

Table 5 (continued)

State	Metropolitan Area	Political Culture
	Utica-Rome	IM
NORTH CAROLINA	Asheville	TM
	Charlotte	TM
	Durham	TM
	Fayetteville	T
	Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point	T
	Raleigh	TM
	Wilmington	T
NORTH DAKOTA	Fargo-Moorehead (ND-MN)	MI
OHIO	Akron	IM
	Canton	I
	Cincinnati	IM
	Cleveland	MI
	Columbus	I
	Dayton	I
	Hamilton-Middleton	I
	Lima	I
	Lorain-Elyria	IM
	Mansfield	I
	Springfield	I
OKLAHOMA	Lawton	TI
	Oklahoma City	IT
	Tulsa	TI
OREGON	Eugene	M
	Portland (OR-WA)	M
	Salem	M
PENNSYLVANIA	Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton	I
	Altoona	I
	Erie	I
	Harrisburg	I
	Johnstown	I
	Lancaster	I
	Philadelphia (PA-NJ)	I
	Pittsburgh	I
	Reading	I
	Scranton	I
	Wilkes-Barre-Hazelton	I
	York	I
RHODE ISLAND	Providence-Pawtucket-Warwick	IM
SOUTH CAROLINA	Charleston	T
	Columbia	T
	Greenville	TM
SOUTH DAKOTA	Sioux Falls	I
TENNESSEE	Chattanooga (TN-GA)	TM
	Knoxville	TM
	Memphis (TN-AR)	T
	Nashville-Davidson	T
TEXAS	Abilene	IT
	Amarillo	IT
	Austin	TI

Table 5 (continued)

State	Metropolitan Area	Political Culture
	Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange	TI
	Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito	T
	Bryan-College Station	TI
	Corpus Christi	IT
	Dallas	TI
	El Paso	TI
	Ft. Worth	IT
	Galveston-Texas City	TI
	Houston	IT
	Laredo	TI
	Lubbock	IT
	McAllen-Pharr-Edinburgh	T
	Midland	IT
	Odessa	IT
	San Angelo	IT
	San Antonio	TI
	Sherman-Denison	IT
	Texarkana (TX-AR)	T
	Tyler	TI
	Waco	TI
	Wichita Falls	IT
UTAH	Ogden	M
	Provo-Orem	M
	Salt Lake City	M
VIRGINIA	Lynchberg	T
	Newprot-New Hampton	TI
	Norfolk-Portsmouth	TI
	Petersburg-Colonial Heights	TI
	Richmond	T
	Roanoke	TI
WASHINGTON	Seattle-Everett	MI
	Spokane	M
	Tacoma	MI
WEST VIRGINIA	Charleston	TI
	Huntington-Ashland (WV-KY)	TI
	Wheeling	TI
WISCONSIN	Appleton-Oshkosh	MI
	Green Bay	MI
	Kenosha	IM
	La Crosse	M
	Madison	M
	Milwaukee	MI
	Racine	MI

Source: John Kincaid, "Quality of Urban Life," in John Kincaid (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), pp. 135-42.

which were moralistic tended to foster reform, while those state with individualistic or traditionalistic political cultures did not. Moreover, Ritt found that there was a high correlation between political culture and affluence.[238]

Welch and Peters[239] directed their research at investigating the relationship between political culture and the attitude of state senators towards economic-welfare policy, new social issues, self-designated liberalism, and corruption at all levels of government. Using multiple classification analysis, they found that senators from the moralistic political culture were most likely to favor social change, support government intervention on economic welfare issues, be self-declared liberals, and perceive political corruption as a major political problem. Senators from the traditionalistic political culture were most conservative in the three issues and did not see corruption as a problem. Individualists, on the other hand, occupied the intermediate position on all measures.[240] Their research "supports the notion that the concept of political culture is alive and well. Not only is political culture related to policy outputs in the states, which may be vestiges of earlier political conditions, but it is related to current elite attitudes as well."[241]

Lovrich, Daynes, and Ginger[242] conducted a case study of Indiana to determine the effects of the historical-cultural phenomena on public policy. They state that research "indicates that neither political nor socioeconomic variables--considered exclusively--account for very much of the total variation in state and local public policy."[243] In addition, they state that most research is contemporary in nature and has neglected the traditions and customs that may play a role in the

establishment of policy, thus confining the studies to cross-sectional or time studies of recent behavior and socioeconomic and political characteristics.[244] In their study, they classified 92 counties into political culture categories by historical patterns of migration. Their findings suggest that "the political culture dimension should be included in any such predictive constructs."[245] Moreover, the purpose of their research was not to operationalize historical heritage in the study of public policy, "but only to show that efforts in this direction have the potential of considerable analytical payoff."[246]

Monroe[247] conducted research to more precisely quantify Elazar's theory of political culture using the 102 counties in Illinois as the basis of his analysis. Using historical migrational data from 1815-1916 in three stages, his study "revealed that it is possible to systematically and quantitatively measure the historical sources of political variation within the American states"[248] and that "the Elazar schema does seem to be verified as a general pattern."[249]

Local Control and Educational Politics

As the schools entered the 1950s, an understanding of school boards and local school district governance began to emerge. In 1959, Thomas H. Eliot[250] called for a better understanding of educational politics. He emphasized the fact that since schools are the objects of local control, they could hardly be considered apolitical. "Laymen assume that local control means control by the people of the district, usually through elected representatives."[251] The professionals insist that schools are a special province of theirs and that the voters are "a necessary evil who must be reckoned with because they provide the

money."[252] Professionals contend, then, that "no one but a professional educator has any business criticizing the methods or ideas of professional educators."[253] Consequently, professionals have the greatest stake in local control since they dominate the curricular and personnel aspects of education.[254] Although state requirements differ, local interests from rural to urban districts may differentiate instructional programs; the curricula and pedagogy in particular districts reflect the backgrounds and values of the student population such that "local control in the most fundamental matters--curriculum and teaching--is in professional hands."[255]

However, whoever runs the public schools must deal with the most significant subjects for decision-making--the curriculum, the facilities, the units and organization of government, and personnel. Shaping all of these "is the omnipresent issue of finance."[256] Mann concurs stating that even the "professional litany reinforces such attitudes by teaching that people who are not professionals are ipso facto not competent to participate in 'professional' education decisions."[257] Hence, when it comes to the educational program, elected school boards perform the function of spokesmen for the school administration <u>to</u> the community rather than communicating the various interests of the community <u>to</u> the school administration.[258]

Prior to Eliot's concern, Neal Gross[259] conducted research to attempt to answer pertinent questions in regards to school boards and superintendents. In interviews with various superintendents, they cited the school board as a major obstacle to performing their duties. Reasons varied from the politicizing of board positions during elections to curricular apathy to maintaining a balanced budget.[260] He concluded,

however, that, in most communities, there is "only one way in which citizens usually can themselves do anything which is legally acceptable . . . with respect to the schools. This is to cast their vote in a school board election . . ."[261] Clearly, Gross felt that "the control of the schools [was] anchored in the local community."[262]

Willis D. Hawley[263] conducted research on the concept of organizational rigidity and its impact on the schools. He discussed several sources of organizational rigidity to attempt an operational definition of the concept leading to four characteristics as follows: (1) Centrality of Key Decision-Making; (2) Standardization of Organization Structure and Processes; (3) Routinization of Relationships with Clients; and (4) Lack of Changefulness.[264] Because of this rigidity which exists in the bureaucratic structures of the schools, the myth of professionalism--"the idea that only trained and certified educators can really understand and prescribe the ways children learn best"[265]--is one avenue the schools utilize to restrict areas in which political action, i.e., lay intervention, is seen as appropriate. Essentially, professionals dominate school politics and its agenda. Hawley emphasizes the fact that "school boards themselves accept the professionalism thesis and, in effect, perpetuate the myth."[266] Consequently, there is a reduction of demands upon the bureaucracy by the clients while concomitantly broadening its autonomy from the board itself.

Iannaccone and Lutz[267] conducted research that focused on school board elections. In describing the character of school boards, the authors state that, in the absence of a two-party system, school boards have developed an unusual degree of autonomy.[268] Although school

districts enjoy some degree of fiscal independence from other local governments, they are still "legal creatures of the state without sovereignty of their own."[269] Nonetheless, the decisions made by school districts concerning pedagogy, educational administration, curriculum development, and guidance processes rest on value-laden premises.[270] These values exist because "the American public tends to think nostalgically of school districts as if they were small town centers,"[271] the sacred rural community where the old ways are better than the new; the secular community places a high positive value on change itself.[272] However, because teachers are unwilling to change their profession, because students attend school in compliance with compulsory education, and because most parents cannot realistically opt for private schools, the closed elite's control of educational policymaking traps them all.[273]

As proponents of dissatisfaction theory, Iannaccone and Lutz concluded from their research that electoral defeat of an incumbent board member indicates changing expectations for education in the community. Furthermore, the authors see incumbent defeat as a crucial public input which probably leads to significant changes in the governance of school districts. They offer a caveat, however, in that there is a considerable time lag between real changes in the community and responses in school government. Although social and financial changes occur gradually and steadily, political change occurs infrequently and suddenly. Essentially, while the old guard holds the positions, the system remains closed. So in response to the question of whether school districts are democratically controlled, the Iannaccone-Lutz model seems to indicate in the positive.[274]

In 1978, Lutz and Iannaccone[275] published their ethnographic study of Robertsdale, a Midwestern school district in a state of unresolved conflict during the late 1950s, and made field observations for a three-year period. In verifying the original Iannaccone-Lutz model, the authors concluded from the Robertsdale case that as boards develop educational policy, considerable citizen dissatisfaction occurs, resulting in community-board conflicts, incumbent school board member defeat, and superintendent turnover. This series of events describes a process of democratic political theory that requires responsiveness within public education.[276] Furthermore, their findings show that school board culture maintains that education is too important an issue to politicize and that board members are trustees for the public and not representatives of the public.[277] "Most school board members do not think of themselves as representatives of the people but rather as trustees for the people. They do not vote as the people wish, but as they think best."[278] Board members must bear in mind that "the noblesse oblige' of an elite aristocracy"[279] does not fit well with the traditions of American democracy, especially if the decisions of that noble group appear to the public as wrong. Essentially, evidence seems to indicate that local boards continue as the primary grass-roots unit of democratic government in America despite the continual loss of discretionary power to Washington and state capitals.[280]

These findings seem to underscore the initial assumption posited by Counts[281] in 1927. In his study, Counts found that there was a high representation on local boards from the business sector, thus influencing the managerial aspects of the city, county, state, college, and university boards (he omitted local school district boards).[282] In

addition, these results also seem to address the challenge issued by Charters[283] in 1955. Charters states that school board decisions are products of an essentially social enterprise. Moreover, Charters queries about the role of social influence in this social enterprise. He states that this is one facet in the decision-making process that bears investigation insofar as it involves the shaping and formulating of school policy. How certain members of a school board are more effective than others, how they attain their influence, and how they influence the decision-making process are areas which affect the nature of school board service.[284]

In research studies regarding local control, Wirt states that "the political system is understood to be that organization, found in every society, which is legitimized to engage in the 'authoritative allocation of resources and value.'"[285] Consequently, this gives rise to differences of view regarding the instruments employed (teachers, curriculum, texts), the values taught, and the effectiveness of the instruction.[286] As a result, "the ethos of 'local control' of schools is a variant on the ideology of 'states' right,' which has generated much of the intergovernmental friction in our history."[287] Further, because the state and national governments have set limits within legal frameworks, "'local' politics is never fully local in this nation."[288] He concludes that more research is needed in the historical relationship between the discipline of political science and the study of education. Moreover, further research is needed in the history of political change and the schools.[289]

Wirt and Kirst convincingly demonstrate in their review of the literature that the conventional wisdom of educational administration is

concerned with "centralization, expertise, professionalization, nonpolitical control, and efficiency."[290] In other words, the characteristic concern of educational administration is with the product of political and administrative outcomes rather than the system's processes. Further, "the most significant reason for the meager scholarly analysis of educational politics may be the lack of an applicable theoretical orientation and methodology."[291]

For local control to exist, they contend, the ideology of "community participation" stresses that citizens must be "participate" rather than "involved" or "consulted."[292] Moreover, if all persons in a political system are important, that system must respond to their wishes.[293] The appeal to community denotes that every school is a segment of a community association and interest in which the ultimate criteria of usefulness, relevance, and benefit of any curricular element must reside. Hence, the community must determine, directly or via its representatives, those matters that deserve first priority in the curriculum.[294] Indeed, "many 'free' schools and 'free' universities across the country, as well as 'progressive' or 'radical' schools base their programs on a particular community or on the free choices of individual students."[295]

Professionalism was a product of the Progressive Era during the nineteenth century. As such, professionalism has been the enemy of local control since then.[296] The professionalization of the public schools and the universality of free education have shaped the politics of education in the past few decades. Society has come to recognize and respect the educational professionals and, at the same time, depend upon their developments.[297]

Wirt and Kirst state that political cultures determine the role that state education agencies play in establishing and enforcing minimum curricular standards.[298] Hypothetically, then, states with strong localistic tendencies will allow their local school districts some flexibility in curriculum development.

However, most states have defined finite educational programs from kindergarten to teacher certification. Empowered by legislation, most state education agencies have establishem minimum curricular standards for pupil promotion, graduation, and even the instructional materials used. Some state boards have adopted standard courses of study, detailed guidelines for subject areas, and textbook adoption procedures. With respect to teacher certification, most states have established highly detailed regulations and statutes governing requirements for certification, length of the training program, program content, and institutional accreditation standards.[299]

Because political cultures emphasize different values, "curricular tensions exist within the schools because of different value bases and group interests."[300] Essentially, the important point is that decentralization and local control involve basic political issues in regards to who shall have the right to authoritatively allocate these values. Theoretically, the community should have the right to locally "hire, fire, and promote school personnel,"[301] supporting the "belief that the local school district 'belongs' to its citizens."[302]

Local Control and the Courts

Not only have control, curriculum, professionalism, and finance received much debate in the public forum but in the courts as well.

However, where laymen and professionals alike may argue the wisdom of statutes and policies, the courts examine the legality thereof. Legality and wisdom are not synonymous.

Since education is a state function granted under the General Welfare Clause of the Preamble and the Tenth Amendment, the only restriction imposed upon the state is that of the U.S. Constitution and its implementation by Congress. Court decisions, and they are legion, affirm the right of state legislatures to have complete control over the public schools within its boundaries. Because legislatures may alter the structure of education in the states, their legislative and plenary powers over education are inexhaustible in their exercise, provided there are no violations of the federal Constitution. Indeed, "the state legislature, in its discretion, can enact legislation which of itself creates or abolishes school districts."[303]

Because of the centralizing that occurred in the nineteenth century, each of the 50 states established a state education agency (SEA). Constitutionally, state boards are one step below the legislature in the hierarchy, charged with the formulation of policy for education. The courts have held that the delegation of authority to state boards of education (SBOE) does not raise "real questions" since legislatures possess unlimited power in delegating that power to any agency they have created as long as they retain the power to withdraw that authority. Moreover, the courts have distinguished between the power of "general supervision," vested in the SBOE, and "supervision of schools," vested in local boards. However, where legislation is specific, the SBOE may not deviate from the prescriptions.[304] Thus,

state and local boards may not alter the number of days in a school year, discipline procedures, or employment practices.

Every state has certain statutory prescriptions related to curricular matters. These laws address certain things that the public schools must teach and, more specifically, how they should teach them. Constitutional restraints notwithstanding, legislatures possess plenary power over public school curricula.[305] Moreover, "there is no question as to the legal right of the state to prescribe textbooks."[306] "The courts recognize that it is an administrative function of school boards and administrators to meet changing educational conditions through the creation of new courses, reassignment of teachers, and rearrangement of curriculum."[307] Hence, the clients of a local school district cannot demand that the schools offer a particular course because another school district offers it.

In addition to curricular matters, school finance has been the subject of heated debate since the establishment of public education. At the forefront of this debate has been that of taxation. The courts have repeatedly held that taxation is a special power which the legislature must specifically confer upon a subordinate governmental agency if the power is to exist there. "The power to establish and maintain schools does not carry with it any implied power to levy taxes therefor."[308] This is the concept of education as a state function rather than a local function. Moreover, since "the state may compel a local district to establish and maintain schools of a specific standard, the local district must bear the burden of financing its schools without the consent of the inhabitants."[309] Furthermore, because statutory "plans of apportionment comprehend only those funds set out in the

constitution,"[310] the state does not have to spend the taxes in the district in which it collects them. Moreover, "no authority to borrow money is implied from the fact that the board is charged with the operation and management of the schools."[311]

In addition to not being able to require school districts to spend all collected taxes within the district and to offer specific courses offered in other districts, parents and students have no vested right to attend a particular school. School boards have the general power to assign pupils.[312]

All states have some statutory provisions governing teacher certification. Subsequently, a certificate issued by the state is a declaration of legal competence to teach in that state. Moreover, as the administrative arm of the legislature, a state board of education may enact bylaws and change standards for certification, limit the time-span of a certificate, but cannot waive statutory requirements.[313] Indeed, "certification requirements, if any, are a matter for the state legislature."[314]

Statutory provisions regarding local boards are specific. Powers not expressly granted by statute are either implied or plenary. For example, local boards may not employ anyone for a given position without a certificate if the state requires one but they may require additional desiderata other than those mandated by the state for certification.[315] In terms of local control, "as statutes place the power and duty of employing teachers in the board, it follows that the board must exercise that function itself."[316]

In sum, because state boards of education are the administrative arm of state legislatures, there are few powers which are local in

nature. As a result, the courts have upheld legislation involving curricular, financial, professional, and control issues.

NOTES

[1]David Tyack, and Thomas James, "State Government and American Public Education: Exploring the 'Primeval Forest,'" History of Education Journal, 26:39-71, Spring 1986, p. 41.

[2]Ibid., p. 39.

[3]Ibid., p. 41.

[4]Ibid., p. 44.

[5]Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), p. 15.

[6]Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 52.

[7]Bailyn, Education in the Forming . . ., p. 16.

[8]Ibid., p. 17.

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CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Before engaging in the main thrust of this research, a brief recap of the discussion in Chapter 2 is necessary, if only to review the major points.

The function of education in England was for the transfer of culture and the perpetuation of English society. The primary agents of transfer were the family, community, and church. The arrival of the English in America resulted in the transplantation and transformation of their culture, thus affecting the social function of education. Once the perpetuator of society, education became the product of society.

American society was a frontier society, continuously seeking to advance man's control of the natural environment and concomitantly benefitting from the social and economic gain from the extension of that control. Since 1607, the American frontier had traversed through three stages: rural-land, lasting from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries; urban-industrial, beginning in the nineteenth century and transforming the cities from service centers into centers of opportunity, producers of new wealth, and social innovators; and metropolitan-technological, beginning in the midtwentieth century and characterized by a radical reordering of industrial society via technological revolutions. The political cultures invariably followed these migrations, thus creating characteristic cultural patterns in each state.

Education became an important aspect of American life and society. It also became a controversial political issue, "no more a domain 'above politics' in the nineteenth century than it is today."[1] In the North, education was a commitment of principle to different political blocs although there was great deliberation as to matters of taxation, textbooks, state and county superintendents, and the distribution of common school funds.[2]

The establishment of political cultures exacerbated the controversy of the role of education. Where one culture viewed education as a local enterprise, another saw its role as a means of erasing ethnic distinctiveness. Local control of the schools in New England, the Middle Atlantic, and Midwestern states was of paramount importance. As the political cultures migrated westward, so did the controversy. The new states of the Midwest and Far West gave to local school districts those powers of the state itself--formulating, operating, and financing educational programs to serve the need of the communities.[3]

As the nation expanded, the role of education also expanded. The debate concerning its role intensified. Professional educators sought, and succeeded, to universalize education. In the process, they gradually divorced the schools from the communities they served. The professionals maintained that the responsibility of educating the child was one of the state and not only of the parent. This led to compulsory education and taxation.[4] With the politicization of public education and in the face of bitter opposition, the professionals fortified their stance. They not only universalized education but also set minimum standards for curriculum, teacher certification, and

finance.[5] Essentially, "today's educational structures are historical products and represent patterns that have become deeply embedded in American society and are enormously resistant to change."[6]

An Operational Definition of Local Control

Given the discussion in Chapter 2, the research indicates that local control is not a function of one variable but, rather, a function of several variables. Indeed, Carr[7] states that, in history, causal relationships consist of several variables leading to a major event rather than one major variable causing one major event.

In like fashion, then, local control consists of several variables. From within the political science context, one can see the fusion of political culture, community, governmental structure, and law. From the historiographical context, one can see the intermingling of these same variables. Thus, from a broad general view, the research indicates that local control is the power of the electorate/community to influence the policy/decision-making process of the local government within the value base of a given political culture.

Using the broad definition of local control proposed above, one can venture to propose an operational definition of local control within the realm of education. However, before positing a definition, there must be semantic readjustments. In education, the local government is the local school board, defined and constrained by state law. The community is the electorate which resides within the confines and service of the local school district. In addition to the semantic readjustments, there is the matter of the authoritative

allocation of values in education--control, professionalism, finance, and curriculum--which the decision-making process must address. Further, because most states have established state education agencies, one must include these governmental entities. Hence, the historiographical and political research denotes the following operational definition:

> Local control is the power of the electorate/community to influence the legislation-/policy-making process of the state/local board within the value base of a given political culture in regards to control, professionalism, finance, and curriculum.

Sample Selection

The sample consists of eight states as follows: Arizona, California, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, and Texas. They include four of the five most populous states (see Table 6), four of the five with the highest total enrollment, four of the five highest employers of teachers, and four of the five with the largest number of operating local school districts (see Table 7).

The sample also includes considerable variance in other pertinent characteristics. Most notably are region, per capita wealth, per capita student expenditures, mean per pupil ADA, growth, political culture, and educational organization (see Table 6).

Development of the
Local Control Index

Since researchers conduct methodological inquiries to determine the relationships between the design of the research and the conceptual implications, the question then becomes whether the research is heuristic and directed at theory development or evaluative

Table 6. State Rankings by Population, Per Capita Personal Income, Per Capita School Expenditures, and Mean Per Pupil ADA, 1978.

State	Population	Rank	Per Capita Personal Income	Rank	Per Capita School Expenditures	Rank	Mean Per Pupil in ADA	Rank
AK	403000	50	10851	1	821	1	3341	1
AL	3742000	22	6247	47	275	43	1281	44
AR	2186000	33	6183	49	275	44	1193	48
AZ	2354000	31	7374	30	339	28	1436	34
CA	22294000	1	8850	5	387	21	1674	20
CN	3099000	24	8914	4	531	2	1914	16
CO	2670000	28	8001	15	452	6	1649	21
DE	583000	47	8604	8	424	13	2138	4
FL	8594000	8	7505	27	316	35	1594	22
GA	5084000	14	6700	37	265	47	1189	49
HA	897000	40	8380	11	403	18	1963	12
IA	2896000	26	7873	17	431	10	2002	10
ID	878000	41	6873	36	304	40	1206	47
IL	11243000	5	8745	7	437	8	2058	8
IN	5350000	12	7696	23	345	26	1449	33
KA	2348000	32	8001	15	355	24	1682	19
KY	3498000	23	6615	40	260	48	1294	43
LA	3966000	20	6640	38	316	36	1481	30
MA	5774000	10	8063	14	427	11	2137	5
MD	4143000	18	8306	12	427	12	2100	6
ME	1091000	38	6333	46	327	30	1522	28
MI	9189000	7	8442	10	466	5	1975	11
MN	4008000	19	7847	18	477	4	1962	13
MO	4860000	15	7342	31	274	45	1425	35
MS	2404000	30	5736	50	259	49	1220	45
MT	785000	43	7051	33	433	9	2527	2
NC	5577000	11	6607	41	335	29	1343	41
ND	652000	46	7478	28	311	39	1518	29
NE	1565000	35	7391	29	294	41	1526	26
NH	871000	42	7277	32	279	42	1366	38
NJ	7327000	9	8818	6	423	14	2333	3
NM	1221000	37	6505	43	388	20	1476	31
NV	660000	45	9032	3	359	22	1526	26
NY	17748000	2	8267	13	447	7	2527	2
OH	10749000	6	7812	20	322	31	1581	23
OK	2880000	27	6951	34	320	33	1461	32
OR	2444000	29	7839	19	397	19	1929	15
PA	11796000	4	7733	21	412	17	2079	7
RI	935000	39	7526	26	342	27	1840	18
SC	2918000	25	6242	48	315	37	1340	42
SD	690000	44	6841	35	321	32	1385	36
TN	4357000	17	6489	44	268	46	1209	46
TX	13014000	3	7697	22	315	38	1352	40
UT	1307000	36	6622	39	417	15	1363	39
VA	5148000	13	7624	24	356	23	1560	24
VT	487000	48	6541	42	353	25	1550	25
WA	3774000	21	8450	9	415	16	1951	14
WI	4679000	16	7597	25	(NA)	(x)	(NA)	(x)
WV	1860000	34	6456	45	320	34	1374	37
WY	424000	49	9096	2	500	3	2007	9

Source: Bureau of Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979. 100th ed. Washington, D.C., 1979.

Table 7. State Rankings by Districts in Operation, Enrollment, and Teachers Employed, 1983.

State	Districts	Rank	Enrollment	Rank	Teachers	Rank
AK	53	43	92918	48	5747	49
AL	128	35	721901	20	35619	21
AR	364	16	432120	32	23696	33
AZ	202	25	503228	27	26268	29
CA	1027	2	4089017	1	174290	1
CN	165	29	477585	29	32317	26
CO	181	28	542196	26	28241	28
DE	17	48	91406	49	5429	50
FL	67	40	1495543	8	85028	7
GA	187	26	1050859	11	56491	11
HA	1	50	162241	40	7007	47
IA	437	13	497287	28	31779	27
ID	114	36	206352	39	9847	39
IL	1007	3	1853316	4	102130	5
IN	304	19	984384	12	50509	14
KA	304	20	405222	33	26096	30
KY	100	37	647414	23	32458	24
LA	66	41	782434	17	42179	17
MA	346	17	878844	14	56873	10
MD	24	47	683491	22	37275	20
ME	230	24	209753	38	13492	38
MI	573	9	1735881	7	79982	8
MN	435	14	705242	21	39392	19
MO	544	11	795453	16	46761	15
MS	153	31	467744	30	24955	31
MT	551	10	153646	42	9479	41
NC	141	32	1089606	10	55126	13
ND	288	22	117213	46	7067	45
NE	930	4	266998	37	17548	35
NH	158	30	159030	41	9821	40
NJ	581	8	1147571	9	73593	9
NM	89	39	269711	36	14532	37
NV	17	49	150442	43	7365	44
NY	713	5	2674818	3	145647	3
OH	614	7	1827300	5	96927	6
OK	615	6	591389	25	34999	22
OR	307	18	447109	31	24409	32
PA	500	12	1737952	6	102207	4
RI	40	45	136180	44	8848	42
SC	92	38	604553	24	32323	25
SD	187	27	123060	45	8355	43
TN	141	33	822057	15	39409	18
TX	1072	1	2989796	2	170529	2
UT	40	46	379055	34	15650	36
VA	134	34	966110	13	56388	12
VT	245	23	90416	50	6242	48
WA	298	21	736239	19	34757	23
WI	431	15	774646	18	45311	16
WV	55	42	371251	35	22503	34
WY	49	44	100965	47	7010	46

Source: Hana Umlauf Lane (ed.), The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1983 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1983).

to confirm current theory or hypotheses. Because there is no theory of local control per se, the concepts proposed in the Local Control Index (LCI) will attempt to add to the corpus nosgere of educational administration.

The purpose of the LCI, then, is twofold. Not only will it add to the body of knowledge but will also serve as a technique for researchers in educational administration to use to empirically examine the relationship between public school taxpayers and policymaking. Indeed, Tyack and James contend that, the state notwithstanding, research must consider politics, law, and governmental structure in the analyses of the common school.[8]

Since each state is unique, the first analytical task is to identify those conditions which cause methods of local control to differ. For example, why do certain types of political culture lead to certain conditions of local control rather than another? More importantly, is each state entirely unique or do all states share some critical political characteristics?

Through time, each state has established its own political culture. Each of the eight states has provided for the education of its children, each with different styles. Since local control is a function of state law, the unit of analysis is the state and its education code. The LCI will correlate the degree of local control with political culture by using the scores derived from the four profiles.

For example, those states which Elazar classifies as Individualistic should have education codes which allow local school districts the greatest amount of discretion in terms of

professionalism, finance, control, and curriculum, resulting in a higher score on the LCI.

Those states classified as Moralistic should have education codes favoring state intervention in the areas of control and curriculum while allowing for greater discretion in professionalism and finance, yielding a median score on the LCI.

Lastly, those states classified as Traditionalistic in nature should have education codes greatly restricting localities in every aspect of education, resulting in a relatively low score on the LCI.

Since Elazar's classification scheme is actually an nonochotomy, there is overlapping of the three political cultures resulting in a continuum. Individualistic, Moralistic, and Traditionalistic serve as reference points on the continuum.

The Local Control Index Profiles

Historically, concern over public schooling has revolved around four authoritatively allocated values--control, professionalism, finance, and curriculum. Although intertwined, it is possible to dissect each of these areas of concern to determine whether the states do, indeed, share some political characteristics.

Each profile will reflect pertinent issues that have emerged within each area (see Appendix A). The design of the profiles is such that they preserve the possibility of testing, in a limited and probing manner, some heuristic notions regarding local control. A brief synopsis of each profile follows:

1. Professionalism: 17 variables will cover such topics a self-governance, self-licensure, teacher certification,

salary, duties, inservice, teacher retirement systems, sabbatical leaves, and others.

2. Finance: 15 variables concern such items as taxation (state and local), funding formulas, per pupil expenditure, per pupil ADA, budgeting, bond issues, sick leave, transportation.
3. Control: 23 variables will address such issues as size, annexation, detachment, attendance, school year, school day, state boards, local boards, collective bargaining, arbitration, strikes, student disciplinary measures.
4. Curriculum: 17 variables focus on textbooks, curriculum requirements, graduation requirements, and other associated items.

The 72 dependent variables represent those items that state legislatures include/exclude in their education codes/public school laws.[9]

Researchers must bear in mind that the LCI is not absolute. It is not totally inclusive or exclusive of the issues in each area. However, the dependent variables used represent those that have consistently emerged in history, law, and politics as having an overbearing influence on the local control of education.

Instrumentation

Before describing the computational mechanism of the Local Control Index, a brief analogy will serve to illustrate its function. Geologists typically use a series of sand screens, varying in size from larger to smaller gauge, to determine the composition and size of

fossiliferous sediment samples. Stacked one atop the other, from the largest to the smallest gauge, the geologist drops a handful of sediment sample on the topmost screen. As the sample progresses through each screen, certain sedimentary components separate by size while allowing the sand granules to travel completely to the bottom, thus allowing the geologist to classify the particles captured in the screens by type.

In like manner, the Local Control Index will serve the same function as the apparatus described above. The profiles will serve as the individual screens, trapping those characteristics which are unique determinants of local control in a certain state that will allow the researcher to classify a state's degree of local control and governmental tendency (see Table 8).

The Computational Model

Since numerous studies conducted in political science have proven the reliability of Elazar's theory of political subcultures, there is the matter of assigning values to the nine subcultures. Based upon the research conducted by Wirt[10] and concurred upon by Elazar[11], the current research will use Wirt's adaptation with a slight modification. Wirt's adaptation follows:

I IM MI M MT TM T TI IT

Elazar's description of the subcultures would suggest a modification that seeks to create a dipole moment between the Individualistic and Traditionalistic subcultures, reserving the Moralistic subculture as the intermediate area of interaction as follows:

I	IT	IM	MI	M	MT	TM	TI	T
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Table 8. Local Control Index Scale.

LCI	Tendency
10.00 9.75 9.50 9.25 9.00	LOCALISTIC
8.75 8.50 8.25 8.00 7.75 7.50 7.25 7.00 6.75 6.50	L - C
6.25 6.00 5.75 5.50 5.25 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.00 3.75	C - L
3.50 3.25 3.00 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00	CENTRALISTIC

In order to develop the index, each subculture has an assigned value reflecting the extent of state control based upon the descriptions depicted by Elazar. Thus, the Individualistic culture would tend towards localistic control, while the Traditionalistic culture would tend towards centralistic control. The Moralistic culture, on the other hand, would demonstrate a tendency that reflects the influence of the Individualistic and Traditionalistic cultures. For example, if a state has a dominant Moralistic and a Traditionalistic subculture, the state would demonstrate localism with centralizing tendencies, resulting in a submedian LCI score.

The general model for estimating the degree of local control comes from an adaptation of a study using computer simulations of electorates developed by Weber, Hopkins, Mezey, and Munger.[12] To derive the general formula for computing the Local Control Index, an exercise in deductive reasoning is in order.

The information presented in Chapter 2 indicates that state legislation (law) is a function of political culture. The research also seems to indicate that the degree of state control is a function of law. The following mathematical expressions depict these relationships:

$$(1) \quad L = f(PC)$$

$$(2) \quad SC = f(L)$$

Further, local control is a function of state control since local governmental units are legatees of the state, represented as follows:

$$(3) \quad LC = f(SC)$$

Since legislation, or state law, is a written expression of the will of the electorate as dictated by the state's political culture, it

follows, then, that the degree of state control is a function of political culture as follows:

$$(4) \quad SC = f(PC)$$

Hence, local control is a function of the degree of state control and political culture. By way of mathematical substitutions, the relationship between a state and its local unit emerges as follows:

$$(5) \quad LC = f(SC * PC)$$

This leads to the final derivative of the general formula infra:

$$(6) \quad LC_i = 10 - (P_i * C),$$

where LC_i is the local control score for state j in Profile i; 10 is the highest score obtainable by state j in Profile i; P_i is the proportion of state j's positive responses in Profile i; C is the political culture score of state j; and i, the profile. Because there are four profiles of dependent variables, the computation of the LCI follows:

$$(7) \quad LCI = 10 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{4} LC_i}{4}$$

where LCI is the index of state j's degree of local control on a scale of 1 to 10. Because 10 is the highest score state j may receive in Profile i and because the mean of the product of P_i and C represents the degree of state j's control, the difference of the highest score and the mean represent the degree of local control in state j.

Validity

To test the validity of the dependent variables as predictors of local control, the analysis of the data involved the use of correlation and ANOVA. The analysis of the construct proceeded in two

parts. The first part of the discussion focused on the correlational analysis of the data (Appendix B contains the data of the sample of states by profile). The standards used in the correlational analysis were Pearson's product-moment, Spearman's coefficient, and Kendall's Tau B. The second part of the analysis utilized ANOVA. The standards used were $\underline{R}^2$ and Newman-Keuls.[13]

If the sets of results showed a significant difference in LCI scores from year to year for a state in a sample, a significant difference in LCI scores from region to region, or from state to state, then the variables were considered consistent for validating the LCI. With a model for estimating the degree of local control from public school codes, researchers in educational administration can empirically examine the relationship between public school legislation at the state level and its effects on local school districts. More importantly, the utility of the design is such that it is flexible enough for adaptation to other state subunits such as county, municipal, and independent school district policies in the 50 states.

NOTES

[1]David Tyack, and Thomas James, "State Government and American Public Education: Exploring the 'Primeval Forest,'" History of Education Journal, 26:39-71, Spring, 1986, p. 58.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Robert Bendiner, The Politics of Schools (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 25-7.

[4]Fletcher Harper Swift, A History of Public Permanent Common School Funds in the United States, 1795-1905 (New York: Holt, 1911), p. 3.

[5]Bendiner, The Politics of Schools, p. 36.

[6]Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. xvii.

[7]Edward H. Carr, What Is History? (New York: Vintage, 1961), pp. 113-44.

[8]Tyack and James, "State Government . . .," p. 67.

[9]For additional information on public school legislation, see the "State Public School System" Section in The Book of the States series.

[10]Frederick Wirt, "Does Control Follow the Dollar? School Policy, State-Local Linkages, and Political Culture," in John Kincaid (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), pp. 81-100.

[11]Daniel J. Elazar, "Steps in the Study of American Political Culture," in John Kincaid (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), p. 225.

[12]Ronald E. Weber, Anne H. Hopkins, Michael L. Mezey, and Frank J. Munger, "Computer Simulation of State Electorates," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26:549-65, Winter 1972-73.

[13]See Dennis E. Hinkle, William Wiersma, and Stephen G. Jurs, Applied Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing, 1979), especially Chapters 11-13, 17. See also SAS Institute Inc., SAS User's Guide: Statistics, 1982 Edition (Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc.), especially Chapters 3-6, 9, 20.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTRUCT

In the systematic evaluation of the data, the first step was to derive the values of each Profile Score and concomitant LCI. Inspection of Table 9 will reveal, in states where more than one school code was available for the study, significant changes in the Profile Scores and LCI while, in others, there were no significant differences. For example, Texas showed significant differences in all of its Profile Scores between 1964 and 1984. Moreover, with the advent of its HB 72 (1986), its Professionalism Profile Score shows a more dramatic change between 1984 and 1986. Illinois, on the other hand, showed no significant changes in its Profile Scores and LCI between 1939, 1967, and 1983.

The next step was to determine the mean, median, standard deviation, and standard error of the mean (see Table 10). The Professionalism Score (PSC) ranged from 2.48 to 9.59; the Finance Score (FSC), from 2.80 to 9.47; the Control Score (COSC), from 3.36 to 9.48; and the Curriculum Score (CUSC) from 4.69 to 9.53. The computed LCI ranged from 3.66 to 9.5175.

Table 11 contains the Pearson product-moment correlation matrix, Table 12 contains the Spearman correlation coefficient matrix, and Table 13 contains the Kendall Tau B correlation matrix. A summary of the Profile Scores correlated with the LCI appears at the bottom of each matrix. Table 14 contains the regression models for each of the Profile Scores with the LCI and political culture. This part of the

Table 9. Computation of the Profile Scores by State, Region, and Culture.

STATE	REGION	CULTURE	YEAR	PP	FP	COP	CUP	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC	LCI
AZ	MNT	7	1984	0.41	0.47	0.41	0.53	7.13	6.71	7.13	6.29	6.8150
CA	PAC	4	1921	0.41	0.93	0.70	0.71	8.36	6.28	7.20	7.16	7.2500
CA	PAC	4	1983	0.59	0.73	0.74	0.76	7.64	7.08	7.04	6.96	7.1800
IL	WNC	1	1939	0.41	0.53	0.52	0.47	9.59	9.47	9.48	9.53	9.5175
IL	WNC	1	1967	0.59	0.80	0.57	0.47	9.41	9.20	9.43	9.53	9.3925
IL	WNC	1	1983	0.59	0.80	0.61	0.53	9.41	9.20	9.39	9.47	9.3675
MS	ESC	9	1958	0.29	0.67	0.52	0.53	7.39	3.97	5.32	5.23	5.4775
MS	ESC	9	1966	0.35	0.80	0.61	0.59	6.85	2.80	4.51	4.69	4.7125
NM	MNT	7	1931	0.29	0.33	0.57	0.47	7.97	7.69	6.01	6.71	7.0950
NM	MNT	7	1938	0.47	0.67	0.57	0.47	6.71	5.31	6.01	6.71	6.1850
NM	MNT	7	1967	0.53	0.60	0.61	0.47	6.29	5.80	5.73	6.71	6.1325
NY	MA	1	1986	0.47	0.80	0.78	0.73	9.53	9.20	9.22	9.27	9.3050
OK	WSC	8	1984	0.41	0.73	0.74	0.59	6.72	4.16	4.08	5.28	5.0600
TX	WSC	8	1964	0.41	0.47	0.74	0.41	6.72	6.24	4.08	6.72	5.9400
TX	WSC	8	1984	0.71	0.87	0.83	0.53	4.32	3.04	3.36	5.76	4.1200
TX	WSC	8	1986	0.94	0.87	0.83	0.53	2.48	3.04	3.36	5.76	3.6600

Table 10. Analysis of the Profiles and Profile Scores.

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	MEDIAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	MINIMUM VALUE	MAXIMUM VALUE	STD ERROR OF MEAN	T
CULTURE	16	5.62500000	7.0000000	3.09569594	1.00000000	9.00000000	0.77392398	7.27
PP	16	0.49187500	0.4400000	0.16630168	0.29000000	0.94000000	0.04157542	11.83
FP	16	0.69187500	0.7300000	0.17026328	0.33000000	0.93000000	0.04256582	16.25
COP	16	0.64687500	0.6100000	0.12213210	0.41000000	0.83000000	0.03053303	21.19
CUP	16	0.54937500	0.5300000	0.10292190	0.41000000	0.76000000	0.02573047	21.35
PSC	16	7.28250000	7.2600000	1.91829264	2.48000000	9.59000000	0.47957316	15.19
FSC	16	6.19937500	6.2600000	2.34624940	2.80000000	9.47000000	0.58656235	10.57
COSC	16	6.33437500	6.0100000	2.18804317	3.36000000	9.48000000	0.54701079	11.58
CUSC	16	6.98625000	6.7100000	1.62105264	4.69000000	9.53000000	0.40526316	17.24
LCI	16	6.70062500	6.5000000	1.91465804	3.66000000	9.51750000	0.47866451	14.00

Table 11. Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Profiles, Profile Scores, Culture, and LCI.

PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS / PROB > |R| UNDER H0:RHO=0 / N = 16

	CULTURE	PP	FP	COP	CUP	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC	LCI
CULTURE	1.00000 0.0000	-0.10214 0.7066	-0.18451 0.4939	0.07604 0.7796	-0.25606 0.3385	-0.74885 0.0008	-0.88201 0.0001	-0.92462 0.0001	-0.95786 0.0001	-0.92468 0.0001
PP	-0.10214 0.7066	1.00000 0.0000	0.53527 0.0326	0.57078 0.0209	0.03902 0.8859	-0.56254 0.0233	-0.17294 0.5218	-0.16182 0.5493	0.08690 0.7490	-0.22172 0.4092
FP	-0.18451 0.4939	0.53527 0.0326	1.00000 0.0000	0.54884 0.0277	0.53420 0.0330	-0.17153 0.5253	-0.27218 0.3078	-0.02076 0.9392	0.01264 0.9630	-0.12961 0.6324
COP	0.07604 0.7796	0.57078 0.0209	0.54884 0.0277	1.00000 0.0000	0.38965 0.1357	-0.45687 0.0752	-0.31595 0.2332	-0.41998 0.1053	-0.13698 0.6130	-0.36021 0.1705
CUP	-0.25606 0.3385	0.03902 0.8859	0.53420 0.0330	0.38965 0.1357	1.00000 0.0000	0.17559 0.5154	0.02694 0.9211	0.18406 0.4950	0.00730 0.9786	0.10637 0.6950
PSC	-0.74885 0.0008	-0.56254 0.0233	-0.17153 0.5253	-0.45687 0.0752	0.17559 0.5154	1.00000 0.0000	0.83245 0.0001	0.86991 0.0001	0.72164 0.0016	0.90677 0.0001
FSC	-0.88201 0.0001	-0.17294 0.5218	-0.27218 0.3078	-0.31595 0.2332	0.02694 0.9211	0.83245 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000	0.91307 0.0001	0.92507 0.0001	0.97153 0.0001
COSC	-0.92462 0.0001	-0.16182 0.5493	-0.02076 0.9392	-0.41998 0.1053	0.18406 0.4950	0.86991 0.0001	0.91307 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000	0.89640 0.0001	0.97304 0.0001
CUSC	-0.95786 0.0001	0.08690 0.7490	0.01264 0.9630	-0.13698 0.6130	0.00730 0.9786	0.72164 0.0016	0.92507 0.0001	0.89640 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000	0.93191 0.0001
LCI	-0.92468 0.0001	-0.22172 0.4092	-0.12961 0.6324	-0.36021 0.1705	0.10637 0.6950	0.90677 0.0001	0.97153 0.0001	0.97304 0.0001	0.93191 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000

	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC	CULTURE
LCI	0.90677 0.0001	0.97153 0.0001	0.97304 0.0001	0.93191 0.0001	-0.92468 0.0001

Table 12. Spearman Correlation Matrix of the Profiles, Profile Scores, Culture, and LCI.

SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS / PROB > |R| UNDER HO:RHO=0 / N = 16

	CULTURE	PP	FP	COP	CUP	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC	LCI
CULTURE	1.00000 0.0000	-0.31490 0.2348	-0.05632 0.8359	0.15374 0.5697	-0.01709 0.9499	-0.74227 0.0010	-0.91024 0.0001	-0.89682 0.0001	-0.93210 0.0001	-0.93099 0.0001
PP	-0.31490 0.2348	1.00000 0.0000	0.53260 0.0337	0.54017 0.0308	0.07580 0.7802	-0.24779 0.3548	0.03161 0.9075	-0.02555 0.9252	0.28467 0.2852	0.00000 1.0000
FP	-0.05632 0.8359	0.53260 0.0337	1.00000 0.0000	0.58934 0.0163	0.57177 0.0207	-0.05060 0.8524	-0.26250 0.3260	-0.08116 0.7651	0.00224 0.9934	-0.13225 0.6254
COP	0.15374 0.5697	0.54017 0.0308	0.58934 0.0163	1.00000 0.0000	0.40622 0.1185	-0.37650 0.1506	-0.32365 0.2214	-0.50486 0.0461	-0.10523 0.6981	-0.40715 0.1175
CUP	-0.01709 0.9499	0.07580 0.7802	0.57177 0.0207	0.40622 0.1185	1.00000 0.0000	0.15269 0.5724	-0.13399 0.6208	0.00836 0.9755	-0.17676 0.5126	-0.06220 0.8190
PSC	-0.74227 0.0010	-0.24779 0.3548	-0.05060 0.8524	-0.37650 0.1506	0.15269 0.5724	1.00000 0.0000	0.84257 0.0001	0.88266 0.0001	0.71376 0.0019	0.88807 0.0001
FSC	-0.91024 0.0001	0.03161 0.9075	-0.26250 0.3260	-0.32365 0.2214	-0.13399 0.6208	0.84257 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000	0.88757 0.0001	0.89696 0.0001	0.95204 0.0001
COSC	-0.89682 0.0001	-0.02555 0.9252	-0.08116 0.7651	-0.50486 0.0461	0.00836 0.9755	0.88266 0.0001	0.88757 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000	0.82162 0.0001	0.97126 0.0001
CUSC	-0.93210 0.0001	0.28467 0.2852	0.00224 0.9934	-0.10523 0.6981	-0.17676 0.5126	0.71376 0.0019	0.89696 0.0001	0.82162 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000	0.90695 0.0001
LCI	-0.93099 0.0001	0.00000 1.0000	-0.13225 0.6254	-0.40715 0.1175	-0.06220 0.8190	0.88807 0.0001	0.95204 0.0001	0.97126 0.0001	0.90695 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000

	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC
LCI	0.88807 0.0001	0.95204 0.0001	0.97126 0.0001	0.90695 0.0001

Table 13. Kendall Correlation Matrix of the Profiles, Profile Scores, Culture, and LCI.

KENDALL TAU B CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS / PROB > |R| UNDER HO:RHO=0 / N = 16

	CULTURE	PP	FP	COP	CUP	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC	LCI
CULTURE	1.00000 0.0000	-0.26349 0.2009	-0.05721 0.7783	0.11494 0.5734	0.00000 1.0000	-0.58917 0.0030	-0.79849 0.0001	-0.75809 0.0001	-0.85790 0.0000	-0.82158 0.0000
PP	-0.26349 0.2009	1.00000 0.0000	0.45594 0.0223	0.43933 0.0283	0.09808 0.6334	-0.24256 0.2126	0.03624 0.8531	-0.00902 0.9631	0.21841 0.2662	0.02673 0.8901
FP	-0.05721 0.7783	0.45594 0.0223	1.00000 0.0000	0.47489 0.0163	0.44080 0.0298	-0.02633 0.8910	-0.21246 0.2715	-0.07052 0.7144	0.01778 0.9269	-0.13926 0.4655
COP	0.11494 0.5734	0.43933 0.0283	0.47489 0.0163	1.00000 0.0000	0.28880 0.1564	-0.28216 0.1435	-0.23122 0.2334	-0.41619 0.0315	-0.07145 0.7136	-0.32352 0.0914
CUP	0.00000 1.0000	0.09808 0.6334	0.44080 0.0298	0.28880 0.1564	1.00000 0.0000	0.10177 0.6070	-0.11198 0.5738	0.00000 1.0000	-0.21556 0.2805	-0.04587 0.8155
PSC	-0.58917 0.0030	-0.24256 0.2126	-0.02633 0.8910	-0.28216 0.1435	0.10177 0.6070	1.00000 0.0000	0.69233 0.0002	0.74894 0.0001	0.55799 0.0032	0.73952 0.0001
FSC	-0.79849 0.0001	0.03624 0.8531	-0.21246 0.2715	-0.23122 0.2334	-0.11198 0.5738	0.69233 0.0002	1.00000 0.0000	0.72104 0.0001	0.76191 0.0001	0.81368 0.0000
COSC	-0.75809 0.0001	-0.00902 0.9631	-0.07052 0.7144	-0.41619 0.0315	0.00000 1.0000	0.74894 0.0001	0.72104 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000	0.67244 0.0004	0.90303 0.0000
CUSC	-0.85790 0.0000	0.21841 0.2662	0.01778 0.9269	-0.07145 0.7136	-0.21556 0.2805	0.55799 0.0032	0.76191 0.0001	0.67244 0.0004	1.00000 0.0000	0.75762 0.0001
LCI	-0.82158 0.0000	0.02673 0.8901	-0.13926 0.4655	-0.32352 0.0914	-0.04587 0.8155	0.73952 0.0001	0.81368 0.0000	0.90303 0.0000	0.75762 0.0001	1.00000 0.0000

	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC
LCI	0.73952 0.0001	0.81368 0.0000	0.90303 0.0000	0.75762 0.0001

Table 14. Regression Analysis of the Profile Scores, Culture, and LCI.

N=16 REGRESSION MODELS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PSC
MODEL: MODEL1

NUMBER IN MODEL	R-SQUARE	VARIABLES IN MODEL
1	0.56077409	CULTURE
1	0.82223479	LCI
2	0.87764120	LCI CULTURE

N=16 REGRESSION MODELS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FSC
MODEL: MODEL1

NUMBER IN MODEL	R-SQUARE	VARIABLES IN MODEL
1	0.77793412	CULTURE
1	0.94386186	LCI
2	0.94570413	LCI CULTURE

N=16 REGRESSION MODELS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE: COSC
MODEL: MODEL1

NUMBER IN MODEL	R-SQUARE	VARIABLES IN MODEL
1	0.85491886	CULTURE
1	0.94681503	LCI
2	0.95108007	LCI CULTURE

N=16 REGRESSION MODELS FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CUSC
MODEL: MODEL1

NUMBER IN MODEL	R-SQUARE	VARIABLES IN MODEL
1	0.86845593	LCI
1	0.91750259	CULTURE
2	0.93222237	LCI CULTURE

analysis produced the results using a default slope of 1.0 and an intercept of 0, 0. In each case, the Profile Scores and concomitant LCI were the independent variables; political culture and region were the dependent variables.

The purpose of the correlation analysis was to determine the overall fit of the Profile Scores with the LCI within the context of culture and region. In the three matrices, each of the Profile Scores produced high positive correlation coefficients. Although the political culture component produced a negative slope, it, too, had high correlation coefficients with respect to the other variables. Because correlation coefficients measure the extent to which two variables covary together, the data indicates that there is a strong linkage between the Profile Scores, political culture, and the resultant value of the LCI. Moreover, the correlation coefficients obtained also indicate that the 72 variables selected are valid components of the LCI in measuring the degree of local control.

The second part of the analysis utilized a special application of ANOVA. The application, General Linear Model (GLM), was more appropriate because ANOVA assumes equal cell size while GLM will analyze variance with unequal cell sizes. The GLM uses the harmonic cell mean in its calculations. The unequal cell sizes occurred because of the states selected, their regional classification by the Census Bureau,[1] and the availability of school codes. Because ANOVA is robust with regards to its distribution, no verification of the distribution was necessary (robust means that a normal distribution is not needed for ANOVA to work well).

In addition to the ANOVA, the analysis employed Newman-Keuls. Statistically, if ANOVA detects at least one significant mean difference based upon the F-ratio, then it is appropriate to use the Newman-Keuls test. Newman-Keuls, then, will detect other significant differences in the mean between groups. Because the Census Bureau categorizes states by subregions and because there were too few states by subregions to gain a global perspective of the construct, the states were classified into broader regions (see Table 15).[2]

As a result of the reclassification, ANOVA detected significant differences in the means for each of the Profile Scores as well as the LCI. The R^2 values ranged from +.80 to +.99 (R^2 indicates the variance in the variable that is attributable to the variance in the other variables). In addition, the Newman-Keuls test detected other significant differences (see Tables 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20).

From the Newman-Keuls test, there were no other significant mean differences detected due to state differences for the PSC (m = 7.2825). The FSC (m = 6.1994), however, showed significant mean differences between Illinois (9.29) and New York (9.20), Arizona (6.71), California (6.68), and New Mexico (6.27), and Mississippi (3.39), Oklahoma (4.16), and Texas (4.11). In the tables, means with the same letter are not significantly different from the mean. The COSC (m = 6.3344) showed even more significant differences. The differences occurred between Illinois (9.43) and New York (9.22), Arizona (7.13) and California (7.12), New Mexico (5.92), Mississippi (4.92), and Oklahoma (4.08) and Texas (3.60). The CUSC (m = 6.9863) showed significant differences between Illinois (9.51) and New York (9.27), Arizona (6.29), California (7.06), and New Mexico (6.71),

Table 15. Means of the Profile Scores and LCI After Reclassification.

STATE	REGION	CULTURE	YEAR	PP	FP	COP	CUP	RECLAS	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC	LCI
TX	WSC	8	1964	0.41	0.47	0.74	0.41	S	6.72	6.24	4.08	6.72	5.9400
TX	WSC	8	1984	0.71	0.87	0.83	0.53	S	4.32	3.04	3.36	5.76	4.1200
TX	WSC	8	1986	0.94	0.87	0.83	0.53	S	2.48	3.04	3.36	5.76	3.6600
IL	WNC	1	1939	0.41	0.53	0.52	0.47	M	9.59	9.47	9.48	9.53	9.5175
IL	WNC	1	1967	0.59	0.80	0.57	0.47	M	9.41	9.20	9.43	9.53	9.3925
IL	WNC	1	1983	0.59	0.80	0.61	0.53	M	9.41	9.20	9.39	9.47	9.3675
NM	MNT	7	1938	0.47	0.67	0.57	0.47	W	6.71	5.31	6.01	6.71	6.1850
MS	ESC	9	1958	0.29	0.67	0.52	0.53	S	7.39	3.97	5.32	5.23	5.4775
CA	PAC	4	1921	0.41	0.93	0.70	0.71	W	8.36	6.28	7.20	7.16	7.2500
NM	MNT	7	1967	0.53	0.60	0.61	0.47	W	6.29	5.80	5.73	6.71	6.1325
CA	PAC	4	1983	0.59	0.73	0.74	0.76	W	7.64	7.08	7.04	6.96	7.1800
NY	MA	1	1986	0.47	0.80	0.78	0.73	N	9.53	9.20	9.22	9.27	9.3050
AZ	MNT	7	1984	0.41	0.47	0.41	0.53	W	7.13	6.71	7.13	6.29	6.8150
OK	WSC	8	1984	0.41	0.73	0.74	0.59	S	6.72	4.16	4.08	5.28	5.0600
NM	MNT	7	1931	0.29	0.33	0.57	0.47	W	7.97	7.69	6.01	6.71	7.0950
MS	ESC	9	1966	0.35	0.80	0.61	0.59	S	6.85	2.80	4.51	4.69	4.7125

MEANS

STATE	RECLAS	N	PSC	FSC	COSC	CUSC	LCI
AZ	W	1	7.13000000	6.71000000	7.13000000	6.29000000	6.81500000
CA	W	2	8.00000000	6.68000000	7.12000000	7.06000000	7.21500000
IL	M	3	9.47000000	9.29000000	9.43333333	9.51000000	9.42583333
MS	S	2	7.12000000	3.38500000	4.91500000	4.96000000	5.09500000
NM	W	3	6.99000000	6.26666667	5.91666667	6.71000000	6.47083333
NY	N	1	9.53000000	9.20000000	9.22000000	9.27000000	9.30500000
OK	S	1	6.72000000	4.16000000	4.08000000	5.28000000	5.06000000
TX	S	3	4.50666667	4.10666667	3.60000000	6.08000000	4.57333333

Table 16. ANOVA and Newman-Keuls for the Professionalism Score (PSC) by State and Region.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PSC

SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE
MODEL	7	44.20123333	6.31446190	4.59
ERROR	8	10.99646667	1.37455833	PR > F
CORRECTED TOTAL	15	55.19770000		0.0240

R-SQUARE	C.V.	ROOT MSE	PSC MEAN
0.800780	16.0991	1.17241560	7.28250000

SOURCE	DF	TYPE I SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	7	44.20123333	4.59	0.0240
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

SOURCE	DF	TYPE III SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	4	10.61446667	1.93	0.1987
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

STUDENT-NEWMAN-KEULS TEST FOR VARIABLE: PSC
NOTE: THIS TEST CONTROLS THE TYPE I EXPERIMENTWISE ERROR RATE UNDER THE COMPLETE NULL HYPOTHESIS BUT NOT UNDER PARTIAL NULL HYPOTHESES

ALPHA=0.05 DF=8 MSE=1.37456

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=1.6

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4	5
CRITICAL RANGE	3.02273	3.74553	4.19788	4.52843

NUMBER OF MEANS	6	7	8
CRITICAL RANGE	4.78929	5.00431	5.18696

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	STATE
A	9.530	1	NY
A A	9.470	3	IL
A A	8.000	2	CA
A A	7.130	1	AZ
A A	7.120	2	MS
A A	6.990	3	NM
A A	6.720	1	OK
A A	4.507	3	TX

ALPHA=0.05 DF=8 MSE=1.37456

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=2.4

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4
CRITICAL RANGE	2.46805	3.05821	3.42755

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	RECLAS
A	9.530	1	N
A A	9.470	3	M
B A	7.350	6	W
B B	5.747	6	S

Table 17. ANOVA and Newman-Keuls Analysis for the Finance Score (FSC) by State and Region.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FSC

SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE
MODEL	7	71.53471042	10.21924435	7.41
ERROR	8	11.03858333	1.37982292	PR > F
CORRECTED TOTAL	15	82.57329375		0.0057

R-SQUARE	C.V.	ROOT MSE	FSC MEAN
0.866318	18.9480	1.17465864	6.19937500

SOURCE	DF	TYPE I SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	7	71.53471042	7.41	0.0057
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FSC

SOURCE	DF	TYPE III SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	4	0.99185000	0.18	0.9426
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

STUDENT-NEWMAN-KEULS TEST FOR VARIABLE: FSC
NOTE: THIS TEST CONTROLS THE TYPE I EXPERIMENTWISE ERROR RATE UNDER THE COMPLETE NULL HYPOTHESIS BUT NOT UNDER PARTIAL NULL HYPOTHESES

ALPHA=0.05 DF=8 MSE=1.37982

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=1.6

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4	5
CRITICAL RANGE	3.02851	3.7527	4.20591	4.53709

NUMBER OF MEANS	6	7	8
CRITICAL RANGE	4.79845	5.01388	5.19689

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	STATE
A	9.290	3	IL
A A			
A	9.200	1	NY
A A			
B A	6.710	1	AZ
B A			
B A	6.680	2	CA
B A			
B A	6.267	3	NM
B			
B	4.160	1	OK
B			
B	4.107	3	TX
B			
B	3.385	2	MS

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=2.4

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4
CRITICAL RANGE	2.47277	3.06407	3.43411

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	RECLAS
A	9.290	3	M
A A			
A	9.200	1	N
A A			
A	6.478	6	W
B	3.875	6	S

Table 18. ANOVA and Newman-Keuls Analysis for the Control Score (COSC) by State and Region.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: COSC

SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE
MODEL	7	71.07021042	10.15288720	109.35
ERROR	8	0.74278333	0.09284792	PR > F
CORRECTED TOTAL	15	71.81299375		0.0001

R-SQUARE	C.V.	ROOT MSE	COSC MEAN
0.989657	4.8104	0.30470956	6.33437500

SOURCE	DF	TYPE I SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	7	71.07021042	109.35	0.0001
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

SOURCE	DF	TYPE III SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	4	4.26096667	11.47	0.0021
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

STUDENT-NEWMAN-KEULS TEST FOR VARIABLE: COSC
NOTE: THIS TEST CONTROLS THE TYPE I EXPERIMENTWISE ERROR RATE UNDER THE COMPLETE NULL HYPOTHESIS BUT NOT UNDER PARTIAL NULL HYPOTHESES

ALPHA=0.05 DF=8 MSE=.0928479

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=1.6

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4	5
CRITICAL RANGE	0.785604	0.97346	1.09102	1.17693

NUMBER OF MEANS	6	7	8
CRITICAL RANGE	1.24473	1.30061	1.34809

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	STATE
A	9.4333	3	IL
A A			
A	9.2200	1	NY
B	7.1300	1	AZ
B B			
B	7.1200	2	CA
C	5.9167	3	NM
D	4.9150	2	MS
E	4.0800	1	OK
E E			
E	3.6000	3	TX

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=2.4

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4
CRITICAL RANGE	0.641443	0.794827	0.890817

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	RECLAS
A	9.4333	3	M
A A			
A	9.2200	1	N
B	6.5200	6	W
C	4.1183	6	S

Table 19. ANOVA and Newman-Keuls Analysis for the Curriculum Score (CUSC) by State and Region.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CUSC

SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE
MODEL	7	38.63457500	5.51922500	56.42
ERROR	8	0.78260000	0.09782500	PR > F
CORRECTED TOTAL	15	39.41717500		0.0001

R-SQUARE	C.V.	ROOT MSE	CUSC MEAN
0.980146	4.4769	0.31276988	6.98625000

SOURCE	DF	TYPE I SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	7	38.63457500	56.42	0.0001
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

SOURCE	DF	TYPE III SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	4	2.01686667	5.15	0.0237
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

STUDENT-NEWMAN-KEULS TEST FOR VARIABLE: CUSC
NOTE: THIS TEST CONTROLS THE TYPE I EXPERIMENTWISE ERROR RATE UNDER THE COMPLETE NULL HYPOTHESIS BUT NOT UNDER PARTIAL NULL HYPOTHESES

ALPHA=0.05 DF=8 MSE=0.097825

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=1.6

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4	5
CRITICAL RANGE	0.806385	0.99921	1.11988	1.20807

NUMBER OF MEANS	6	7	8
CRITICAL RANGE	1.27766	1.33502	1.38375

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	STATE
A	9.5100	3	IL
A A			
A	9.2700	1	NY
B	7.0600	2	CA
B B			
B	6.7100	3	NM
B B			
B	6.2900	1	AZ
B B			
C B	6.0800	3	TX
C C			
C D	5.2800	1	OK
D			
D	4.9600	2	MS

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=2.4

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4
CRITICAL RANGE	0.658411	0.815852	0.914382

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	RECLAS
A	9.5100	3	M
A A			
A	9.2700	1	N
B	6.7567	6	W
C	5.5733	6	S

Table 20. ANOVA and Newman-Keuls Analysis for the Local Control Index (LCI) by State and Region.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LCI

SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F VALUE
MODEL	7	51.18753125	7.31250446	15.39
ERROR	8	3.80120000	0.47515000	PR > F
CORRECTED TOTAL	15	54.98873125		0.0005

R-SQUARE	C.V.	ROOT MSE	LCI MEAN
0.930873	10.2873	0.68931125	6.70062500

SOURCE	DF	TYPE I SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	7	51.18753125	15.39	0.0005
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

SOURCE	DF	TYPE III SS	F VALUE	PR > F
STATE	4	1.05730938	0.56	0.7008
RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.
STATE*RECLAS	0	0.00000000	.	.

STUDENT-NEWMAN-KEULS TEST FOR VARIABLE: LCI
NOTE: THIS TEST CONTROLS THE TYPE I EXPERIMENTWISE ERROR RATE UNDER THE COMPLETE NULL HYPOTHESIS BUT NOT UNDER PARTIAL NULL HYPOTHESES

ALPHA=0.05 DF=8 MSE=0.47515

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=1.6

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4	5
CRITICAL RANGE	1.77719	2.20215	2.46811	2.66245

NUMBER OF MEANS	6	7	8
CRITICAL RANGE	2.81582	2.94224	3.04963

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	STATE
A	9.4258	3	IL
A A			
A	9.3050	1	NY
B	7.2150	2	CA
B B			
B	6.8150	1	AZ
B B			
B	6.4708	3	NM
B B			
B	5.0950	2	MS
B B			
B	5.0600	1	OK
B B			
B	4.5733	3	TX

WARNING: CELL SIZES ARE NOT EQUAL.
HARMONIC MEAN OF CELL SIZES=2.4

NUMBER OF MEANS	2	3	4
CRITICAL RANGE	1.45107	1.79805	2.0152

MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.

SNK GROUPING	MEAN	N	RECLAS
A	9.4258	3	M
A A			
A	9.3050	1	N
B	6.7762	6	W
C	4.8283	6	S

Texas (6.08) and Oklahoma 5.28), and Mississippi (4.96). Lastly, the LCI (m = 6.70) showed significant differences between Illinois (9.43) and New York (9.31), and Arizona (6.82), California (7.22), Mississippi (5.095), New Mexico (6.47), Oklahoma (5.06), and Texas (4.57).

On a regional basis, the Profile Scores and LCI showed significant differences. The Newman-Keuls test showed significant differences between the Northeast (N) and Midwest (M), the West (W) and the South (S). Interestingly, the detected differences in the PSC occurred between the N (9.53) and M (9.47) and the W (7.35) and S (5.75). Significant differences in the FSC occurred between the N (9.20), M (9.29), and W (6.48), collectively, and the S (3.88). he COSC showed differences between the N (9.22) and M (9.43), W (6.52), and the S (4.12). The CUSC showed significant differences between the N (9.27) and M (9.51), W (6.76), and S (5.57). Lastly, the LCI showed significant differences between the N (9.31) and M (9.43), W (6.78), and S (4.83).

In graphic form, a plot of the Profile Score means with culture reveals a negative slope. Further, with time as the third axis, the graph reveals a downward trend (see Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7). In each of the Figures, there is an overlay of LCI means to demonstrate the regressions.

Moreover, the data also indicate a downward trend in the degree of local control in each Profile while showing an upward trend in the degree of state control through the years sampled. The degree of state control was calculated from the difference between the LCI and 10. Although there are gaps in the temporal axis, a trend, nonetheless, emerges (see Figure 8).



Figure 4. Plot of PSC Means by Culture With LCI Overlay.



Figure 5. Plot of FSC Means by Culture With LCI Overlay.



Figure 6. Plot of COSC Means by Culture With LCI Overlay.



Figure 7. Plot of CUSC Means by Culture With LCI Overlay.



Figure 8. Temporal Trend of Variable Scores and State Control With LCI Overlay.

NOTES

[1]The Bureau of Census divides the Continental U.S. into subregions. For example, although Mississippi, Texas, and Oklahoma are in the southern region, they are subdivided into East South Central (ESC) and West South Central (WSC). Illinois, typically considered a Midwestern state, is placed in the West North Central (WNC) subregion; New Mexico is placed in the Mountain (MNT) subregion; Arizona, often considered a Western state and sometimes a Southwestern state, is also categorized in the Mountain subregion; New York, often considered a Northeastern state, is classified as a Middle Atlantic (MA) state, and; California is categorized as a Pacific state rather than as a Western state. See also Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979 (100th ed.; Washington, D.C., 1979).

[2]See Ronald E. Weber, Anne H. Hopkins, Michael L. Mezey, and Frank J. Munger, "Computer Simulation of State Electorates," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26:549-65, Winter 1972-73, p. 552.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FURTHER STUDY

Summary

The research conducted herein was neither in support of nor in direct opposition to local control. Rather, it was to address the perennial issue of local control from a different perspective--the merging of constitutional law, political culture, and history.

Tocqueville, during his visitation of the United States, concluded that "the emigrants who colonized the shores of America in the beginning of the seventeenth century somehow separated the democratic priciple from all the principles that it had to contend with in the old communities of Europe, and transplanted it alone to the New World."[1] Observing that "the settlers of New England were at the same time ardent sectarians and daring innovators,"[2] Tocqueville surmised that the founders of this nation could not have established the United States without the influence of the past, without the mingling of their habits and ideas which they based upon their native education and traditions with those habits and ideas that were exclusively their own.[3] "Education . . . taught them the utility of instruction and . . . enabled them to transmit that instruction to their posterity."[4]

According to Swift,[5] there were four distinct stages in the transition from township to state control: (1) township control of property taxes derived from lands in which the townships resided;

(2) county management of township property taxes in the counties in which the townships resided; (3) state management of township property taxes; and (4) state declaration that all township lands belong to the state, are managed by the state, and the proceeds derived from taxation of said lands shall be distributed among the counties, townships, or districts via some general basis deemed just and equitable.[6]

The forces leading to state ownership and management were as follows: (1) the mismanagement and loss of funds under township control; (2) unequal value of lands in different townships; and (3) growth in the general tendency toward centralization and a growing desire to give unity to the school systems.[7] Essentially, efficiency of operation served as a justification for centralization within and consolidation across school districts.[8] According to Swift, the advantages of state management were as follows: (1) the greatest benefit would be gained if the funds used were not to aid the individual communities but the schools of the state as a whole; (2) it would be easier to hold the state accountable rather than the individual townships; and (3) it would be easier to legislate and enact laws for a state school system rather than individual townships.[9]

Constitutional and legislative provisions regarding school finance also underwent a series of changes. States provided for optional use of their Common School Fund, then drafted legislation which stipulated criteria for participation, and, finally, made participation mandatory. In addition to compulsory participatory legislation, the states required compliance with state directives such

as maintaining schools for a specified term, compulsory attendance, and a local tax effort.[10] Because individual school districts used various methods of apportionment, most states enacted legislation to entice their local units to participate--average daily attendance (ADA).[11] Tocqueville noted that "uniformity [prevailed] in the courses of public instruction as in everything else; diversity as well as freedom [was] disappearing day by day."[12]

The national political culture consists of three main subcultures, each interacting with and affecting the other. Although often cited in the literature of output-as-resources, Easton really focused his analysis on the allocation of values.[13] Moreover,

> if politics is the authoritative allocation of values and a struggle over who gets what, when, and how, then, . . . political culture may be logically prior to the other factors because the political structures established by peoples and the socioeconomic characteristics assumed by groups and individuals over time reflect, translucently perhaps, the values they have sought to allocate authoritatively.[14]

The historiography presented here points to four dimensions of local control. Wirt and Kirst state that "voting support is dependent upon a complex of school-related perceptions--what [the voter] thinks of school costs, teachers, the community, and the educational product."[15] Moreover, "curricular policy is primarily and traditionally the concern of the states and localities."[16] In terms of finance, Usdan et al. state that "without a doubt the most portentous issue for the long run is the matter of educational finance."[17] From the control aspect, Zeigler and Jennings state that the fundamental problem in state-local decision-making processes derives from that of competence of the public and its representa-

tives.[18] Lastly, Zeigler and Jennings maintain that, until educators can agree on a proven method of instruction, teaching will remain as a craft rather than a profession.[19] Said another way, state laws will continue to regulate teacher certification, salaries, retirement, and conditions of employment.[20] In short, the dimensions and variables tested in this study provide prima facie evidence that they are authoritatively allocated values of local control. "Subsequently, where ideologies may differ, conformity to dominant values does not."[21] Moreover, "issues may and will change but the cultural orientation continues and adjusts to them."[22]

In his historiography, Michael Katz states that "there is a functional relationship between the way in which schools are organized and what they are supposed to do."[23] Their role in society derives from the value base of the political culture in which they exist. Tocqueville observed that "in the United States politics are the end and aim of education; in Europe its principal object is to fit men for private life."[24]

Conclusions

The purpose of this research note was to explore, in a heuristic manner, the relationships between history, law, and political culture. Local control is a complex phenomenon and, although these relationships are one way of conceptualizing this phenomenon, "the term, 'local control,' is one expression of the fundamental value of individualism, which is characterized by a belief that the individual can best be protected if one can see what government is doing to one's interests."[25] Moreover, the construct developed in this research

sacrificed some precision for the sake of pursuing more important queries.

The study began its trek with inquiries regarding the notion of the local control of public schooling, i.e., public education. The journey continued with an historiographical discussion of its transplantation and transformation to its evolution. From here, the profiles of professionalism, finance, control, and curriculum emerged which led to the proposed model in Chapter 3. As a result of the analyses in Chapter 4, the research now returns full circle from whence it began, that is, the research questions as follows:

1. The discussion in Chapter 2 indicates that the local control of public schooling is, indeed, a function of political culture. Every state has established the relationship of its school systems with its localities. Moreover, it is these relationships and distinctive patterns of governance that have substantial effects on the four profiles posited in this construct. Furthermore, the states have imparted upon the schools those authoritatively allocated values that are consonant with their political cultures.
2. The state education codes used in this study exhibit the characteristics of their political cultures. Stripped of all identity, a state law by any other name is still a state law. However, when garbed with the trappings of state, region, and political culture, state laws acquire distinct characteristics all their own. In short, state, region, and political culture give value to state law.

3. The data supports the conclusion that local control of education is a function of constitutional constraints, i.e., state education codes. In addition, knowledge of a state's historical legacy is paramount for understanding the character of its present educational policies. From this standpoint, had there been a significant difference between the political culture of a state and its concomitant LCI score, then its history would explain the discrepancy. State laws operate to govern the taxing patterns, size, employment practices, and quality of public schools.
4. Based upon the correlational analysis and ANOVA, the results of this study indicate that the selected variables present consistent picture of the local control of education as measured by the LCI. From the high correlation coefficients and the significant differences detected by ANOVA and the Newman-Keuls test, one can see that the profiles are highly intercorrelated. Consequently, the high intercorrelations demonstrate that the LCI is a valid measure of local control in this study.
5. Because the analyses employed in this study demonstrate strong intercorrelations among the variables, the data also show strong intercorrelations between the profiles. The data also show that each profile is consistent component in the value of the LCI. Also, the data show that the profiles are independent of the LCI. Hence, a change in one profile would necessarily cause changes in another profile, if not more. Moreover, the results of this study concur with Wirt's

observations regarding the money-control nexus. The strong relationships depict some interesting notions regarding the construct of local control suggested in this study because of the internal validity of the LCI.

Consequently, at the very least, this research has added to the current body of knowledge by offering a description some significant phenomena of local control. Although the data in this study do not prove or disprove the existence of local control of education, it does demonstrate that the LCI is operational within the context of the definition proposed in this study. In addition, the study also demonstrates that the authoritatively allocated values of professionalism, finance, control, and curriculum are consistent with the LCI.

The findings in this research accentuate Kincaid's observations such that "the interplays of cultural, structural, socioeconomic variables and their effects on political life are exceedingly complex, in part, because the three variables are interactive. Separating their effects is often an chicken-and-egg problem."[26] Nonetheless, the construct presented here points to those variables that are possibly inclusive as relevant aspects of some ultimate theory. "Thus, even if the distinctness of the political subcultures in the United States is fading, current policies should still show the effects of historical cultural patterns."[27]

Further Study

Implicitly, if not explicitly, the results suggest a number of points of departure to further develop the construct described in this

research. One avenue lies in standardizing the Index by using the profile variables to test all states in a particular region to determine if there are significant differences in the Index within regions.

Another study, easily done with the first, would be to derive Local Control Indices for all states in all regions and then determining if there significant differences between regions. This would further validate the construct proposed in the current study.

Using the profile variables in the model, a researcher could conduct a longitudinal study of a particular state, or all states, to determine if the profile variables are, indeed, predictors of the degree of local control. Although tedious and cumbersome, this type of study would probably prove to be more beneficial in solidifying the construct. At the very least, it would indicate which issues in each dimension were more or less important over time.

Using the aforementioned longitudinal study, a parallel project would be to trace the LCI score with membership changes in the legislature. This type of study would show how changes in state legislatures have affected school laws. Moreover, using Elazar's cultural description of the nation, one could see which sections of a state have predominated in a state's legislature. This would strengthen the history-law-political culture nexus suggested in the model.

Again using the temporal axis, one could obtain the school codes of the 48 contiguous states for a certain span of continuous time and compare the scores by selecting for region and culture. This, also,

would further validate the historical and cultural aspects of the construct in addition to the legal aspect.

With a few semantic changes in the profile variables, a researcher could compare the Profile Scores derived from state education codes and state board of education regulations. This would probably give greater insight into the Local Control Index profile variables because education codes tend to be general in certain cases where SBOE rules tend to be very specific. For example, in the dimension of curriculum, state codes would stipulate the courses needed for high school graduation while SBOE rules would stipulate the exact content of the courses and the amount of time that teachers must devote to each course.

Another approach to testing the reliability of this construct would be to introduce additional variables. These variables could include the number of districts in operation, the number of K-12 students enrolled, and the number of teachers employed. A correlation analysis would show the relationship between these new variables, the Profile Scores, and the Local Control Index. More specifically, it could indicate if states with a high number of school districts, students, and teachers have a more centralistic tendency than states that do not, or vice versa. This study would serve as a means of linking an abstraction with "hard" data. Intuitively, a relationship does exist but the extent of the relationship would be most interesting.

A researcher could also conduct a study in using the Local Control Index to derive a score for a state and then test for the perceptions of legislators, taxpayers, and educators by use of a

questionnaire. This comparison would provide a means of determining the knowledge base of legislators, taxpayers, and educators in terms of their respective school codes and their attitudes regarding state government in terms of their political culture value base.

Using the construct, one could compare the scores derived from the construct with the perceptions of educators. By way of a perceptionnaire, the research would revolve around whether the school laws in a state education code are actually enforced at the local level. This would give further evidence of local control and the extent of its existence.

In short, the hypothesis suggested to all researchers is that the local control of education is a function of political culture in terms of the authoritatively allocated values of professionalism, finance, control, and curriculum. Because the purpose of the study was to draw a relationship between history, law, and political culture, because the operational definition of local control proposed in this research note could lead to the development of a general theory, and because the Local Control Index is a flexible model, Easton would say that "the development of a logically related set of concepts, an integrated conceptual framework at the highest level of abstraction, is vital of we are to establish the limits in subject matter."[28] A general theory of local control, in its ideal and most powerful form, would achieve "maximal value when it constitutes a deductive system of thought so that from a limited number of postulates, assumptions, and axioms, a whole body of empirically valid generalizations might be deduced in descending order of specificity."[29]

NOTES

[1]Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, I (New York: Vintage, 1945), p. 14.

[2]Ibid., p. 45.

[3]Ibid., p. 46.

[4]Ibid., pp. 327-8.

[5]Fletcher Harper Swift, A History of Public Permanent Common School Funds in the United States, 1795-1905 (New York: Holt, 1911).

[6]Ibid., pp. 107-8.

[7]Ibid., p. 117.

[8]L. Harmon Zeigler and M. Kent Jennings, Governing American Schools (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury, 1974), p. 247.

[9]Swift, A History of Permanent School Funds . . ., pp. 118-9.

[10]Ibid., pp. 171-7.

[11]Ibid., p. 183.

[12]Toqueville, Democracy in America, II, p. 323.

[13]David Easton, A Framework of Political Analysis (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 50, 78, 96, 131. See also Easton's A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 352-7.

[14]John Kincaid, (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), p. 7.

[15]Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972), p. 101.

[16]Ibid., p. 223

[17]Michael D. Usdan, David W. Minar, and Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr., Education and State Politics (Columbia University: Teachers College Press, 1971), p. 179.

[18]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, p. 248.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Norman C. Thomas, "Priority Issues in Educational Finance," in Edith K. Mosher and Jennings L. Wagner, Jr. (eds.), The Changing Politics of Education (Berkeley, CA: M^cCutchan, 1978), p. 97.

[21]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, p. 249.

[22]Daniel J. Elazar, "Steps in the Study of American Political Culture," in John Kincaid (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), p. 225.

[23]Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. xvi.

[24]Toqueville, Democracy in America, I, p. 330.

[25]Frederick Wirt, "Does Control Follow the Dollar? School Policy, State-Local Linkages, and Political Culture," in John Kincaid (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), pp. 82.

[26]John Kincaid (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States, p. 6.

[27]Susan Welch and John G. Peters, "State Political Culture and the Attitudes of State Senators Toward Social, Economic Welfare, and Corruption Issues," in John Kincaid (ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), p. 151.

[28]Easton, A Systems Analysis, pp. 11-2.

[29]Ibid., p. 9.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. The Local Control Index

Professionalism Profile

	YES	NO
1. Does the state decree teaching as a "profession?"		
2. Does the state prescribe a "professional" code of ethics?		
3. Does the state prescribe a method of teacher certification?		
4. Does the state prescribe a specific number of days for inservice/teacher institutes?		
5. Does the state prescribe measures for appraising "professional" personnel?		
6. Does the state prescribe a method for teacher dismissal?		
7. Does the state prescribe the powers/duties of the state superintendent/commissioner?		
8. Does the state prescribe the powers/duties of the district superintendent?		
9. Does the state prescribe the powers/duties of teachers?		
10. Does the state prescribe the powers/duties of the principal?		
11. Does the state prescribe a minimum state salary schedule for "professional" personnel?		
12. Does the state mandate a Teacher Retirement System?		
13. Does the state require "professional" educators to pass a competency examination?		
14. Does the state prescribe measures for membership to professional associations?		
15. Does the state prescribe the amount of planning/preparation time?		
16. Does the state prescribe a duty-free lunch?		
17. Does the state provide for leaves of absence/sabbatical leaves for professional development?		

Finance Profile

	YES	NO
1. Does the state prescribe a method for raising taxes?		
2. Does the state prescribe a method for approving school budgets?		
3. Does the state prescribe a maximum tax rate?		
4. Does the state prescribe the payment of transportation costs?		
5. Does the state prescribe a minimum apportionment for maintaining and operating schools?		
6. Does the state require a local effort?		
7. Does the state prescribe a method of calculating ADA?		
8. Does the state prescribe a method of calculating the number of certified teachers needed?		
9. Does the state prescribe an equalization formula?		
10. Does the state prescribe a minimum per pupil/teacher expenditure?		
11. Does the state prescribe a method for spending equalization funds?		
12. Does the state prohibit the financing of secular/nonpublic schools?		
13. Does the state prescribe a method for bonded indebtedness?		
14. Does the state prescribe a method for bond issuance?		
15. Does the state prescribe a minimum sick leave program?		

Control Profile

	YES	NO
1. Does the state provide for a Commissioner/State Superintendent of Education?		
2. Does the state provide for a State Board of Education/Board of Regents?		
3. Does the state prescribe criteria for establishing district boundaries?		
4. Does the state prescribe the length of the school year?		
5. Does the state prescribe the length of the school day?		
6. Does the state prescribe the first day of the school year?		
7. Does the state prescribe a method of establishing high schools?		
8. Does the state prescribe criteria for compulsory attendance?		
9. Does the state prescribe criteria for annexation/consolidation?		
10. Does the state prescribe criteria for detachment?		
11. Does the state prescribe the size of district boards?		
12. Does the state prescribe the powers/duties of district boards?		
13. Does the state prescribe procedures for election to local district boards?		
14. Does the state prescribe a procedure for appointment to the state board/Board of Regents?		
15. Does the state prescribe a procedure for election to the state board/Board of Regents?		
16. Does the state prescribe a method of collective bargaining by professional personnel?		
17. Does the state prescribe a method of collective bargaining by classified personnel?		

	YES	NO
18. Does the state prescribe provisions for binding arbitration of contract disputes; permissive or mandatory; partial or total?		
19. Does the state prohibit strikes?		
20. Does the state prescribe a teacher:student ratio?		
21. Does the state prescribe student disciplinary measures?		
22. Does the state prescribe a semester system of operation?		
23. Does the state prescribe the length of teacher contracts?		

Curriculum Profile

	YES	NO
1. Does the state prescribe a course of study?		
2. Does the state prescribe the content of subjects taught?		
3. Does the state provide for the teaching of creationism/ evolution?		
4. Does the state prescribe the amount of time devoted to each subject?		
5. Does the state prescribe a method of textbook adoption?		
6. Does the state prescribe state textbook adoption for use by the districts?		
7. Does the state prescribe criteria for the issuance of free textbooks?		
8. Does the state prescribe a maximum time limit for textbook use by the district?		
9. Does the state prescribe criteria for the use of instructional materials?		
10. Does the state prescribe criteria for the use of audiovisual materials?		
11. Does the state prescribe vocational education programs?		
12. Does the state prescribe the content of vocational education programs?		
13. Does the state prescribe special education programs?		
14. Does the state prescribe bilingual education programs?		
15. Does the state prescribe a minimum number of credits for high school graduation?		
16. Does the state prescribe a minimum number of credits in certain subjects for high school graduation?		
17. Does the state prescribe a state-administered examination for high school graduates to receive a diploma?		

APPENDIX B. Raw Data of the Sample States by Profile

Professionalism Profile

State	Region	Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
AZ	MNT	1984			Y		Y	Y	Y		Y				Y				Y
CA	PAC	1921			Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y		Y					Y
CA	PAC	1983	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y					Y
IL	WNC	1939			Y	Y		Y	Y		Y			Y	Y				
IL	WNC	1967			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
IL	WNC	1983			Y	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y
MS	ESC	1958						Y	Y	Y			Y	Y		Y			
MS	ESC	1966						Y	Y	Y			Y	Y		Y			
NM	MNT	1931			Y			Y	Y		Y				Y				
NM	MNT	1938			Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y			Y		Y			
NM	MNT	1967	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y							
NY	MA	1986			Y			Y	Y	Y				Y		Y	Y		Y
OK	WSC	1984			Y		Y	Y					Y	Y	Y	Y			
TX	WSC	1964			Y	Y			Y		Y		Y	Y		Y			
TX	WSC	1984	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y		
TX	WSC	1986	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Finance Profile

State	Region	Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
AZ	MNT	1984		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y					
CA	PAC	1921	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
CA	PAC	1983	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y	Y
IL	WNC	1939	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y			Y		Y	Y	Y	
IL	WNC	1967	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
IL	WNC	1983	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MS	ESC	1958	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
MS	ESC	1966	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
NM	MNT	1931			Y	Y								Y	Y	Y	
NM	MNT	1938	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	
NM	MNT	1967		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	
NY	MA	1986	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y			Y	Y	Y
OK	WSC	1984	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
TX	WSC	1964	Y		Y	Y				Y				Y	Y	Y	
TX	WSC	1984	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
TX	WSC	1986	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Control Profile

State	Region	Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
AZ	MNT	1984	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y							Y		
CA	PAC	1921	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y						Y	Y		
CA	PAC	1983	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y
IL	WNC	1939	Y		Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y						Y		
IL	WNC	1967	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y						Y	Y		Y
IL	WNC	1983		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y							Y		Y
MS	ESC	1958	Y	Y		Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y					Y	Y		Y
MS	ESC	1966	Y	Y		Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y					Y	Y		Y
NM	MNT	1931	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y						Y			Y
NM	MNT	1967	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y						Y	Y		Y
NM	MNT	1938	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y						Y	Y		
NY	MA	1986	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y		Y
OK	WSC	1984	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		Y
TX	WSC	1964	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y					Y	Y	Y		Y
TX	WSC	1984	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
TX	WSC	1986	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Curriculum Profile

State	Region	Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
AZ	MNT	1984	Y			Y	Y				Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	
CA	PAC	1921	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y			Y	Y	
CA	PAC	1983	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
IL	WNC	1939	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y			Y		Y				
IL	WNC	1967				Y	Y		Y	Y		Y			Y	Y		Y	
IL	WNC	1983	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y				Y		Y	Y			
MS	ESC	1958	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y				
MS	ESC	1966	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
NM	MNT	1931	Y				Y	Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y			
NM	MNT	1938	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y			Y		Y	Y			
NM	MNT	1967	Y				Y	Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y			
NY	MA	1986	Y						Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y
OK	WSC	1984	Y				Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	
TX	WSC	1964	Y				Y	Y	Y				Y	Y	Y				
TX	WSC	1984	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y			
TX	WSC	1986	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y			